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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This case study was commissioned by the 
International Water Management Institute as part of 
an Asian Development Bank supported regional 
study on water management institutions. This case 
study is one of three case studies of advanced river 
basins (Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, 
Omonogawa in Japan and Brantas in Indonesia), and 
five other river basin studies in North China, West 
Sumatra of Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka. 
The Murray-Darling River Basin in Australia provides 
some interesting lessons on how a resource that 
crosses many jurisdictional lines can be managed by 
balancing economic principles and ecological 
sustainability in a political context.  Given the 
complexity of the situation that involves four States, a 
territory government, a federal government, many 
catchment boards and hundreds of local 
governments, it is amazing that the system functions 
and has evolved as well as it has. 
The system grew out of a desire to develop an 
irrigation industry after World War II.  This 
development era has past and the focus has shifted to 
the management of a scarce resource and the need to 
bring a set of environmental policies under control.  
There are elements in the present political 
arrangements that have encouraged the various 
jurisdictions to work towards management solutions.  
Jurisdictions must work in a context which is 
characterised by ￿over commitment￿ or, at least, ￿full 
commitment￿ of the Basins￿ resources and serious 
water quality problems.  
An important element in the present political 
arrangements is the National Competition Policy 
which is designed to encourage the States and 
Territories to participate in a process of reform.  
Water along with many other sectors has been 
undergoing significant change as a result of this 
policy.  States have been given a financial incentive to 
undertake reform.  A series of ￿tranche payments￿ in 
1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 are dependent on 
the State or Territory meeting certain goals.  In the 
area of water, the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) met and agreed upon a set of principles Final Report 
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concerning recovery cost pricing, separation of water 
rights from land title, water trading and the inclusion 
of the State of the environment in policy 
development.  
Second, the Commonwealth and the States of New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South 
Australia signed the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement in order to improve the use of the land, 
water and environmental resources of the Basin.  In 
response to the declining health of the river system, a 
Cap on surface diversions was introduced and 
periodic monitoring and audits have been undertaken 
to ensure compliance.  A process of extending the cap 
to cover ground water resources is under way.  To 
facilitate development and improvement of existing 
conditions, water trading arrangements have been 
introduced.   
Third, there has been a move by the States and 
Territories to separate the role of planning and 
regulation from the day to day operations of water 
delivery.  As part of this process, States and 
Territories have been very conscious of the need to 
involve the various stakeholders in the Basin.  Most of 
the jurisdictions have been moving towards models of 
skills based local boards who prepare planning 
documents regarding how water should be allocated.  
Responsibility for the day to day delivery of water has 
been devolved to corporations who have no direct 
role in policy development. 
Fourth, States allow trading in salinity offsets and are 
in the process of negotiating valley based salinity 
targets to be achieved through the introduction of 
salinity trading and other related incentive 
mechanisms. 
Today, the new policy reform issue is the 
development of strategies and policies to manage the 
expected impact of dryland salinity on the Murray 
and Darling River Systems.  A related issue is the 
search for ways to improve river health.  Although of 
initial importance, in this document, these issues are 
left until last because it is first necessary to 
understand how water quantity is managed. Final Report 
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PREFACE  
This is a case study of the institutional arrangements 
in the Murray-Darling River Basin in Australia for the 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) 
with the financial support of the Asian Development 
Bank.  The main objective is to identify the key 
elements of successful water resource management, 
which are likely to transfer to the context of 
developing countries.  The Murray-Darling Basin was 
chosen as an example of an advanced river system 
where resources are managed over a large geographic 
area and across several jurisdictions.  The institutions 
in the Basin have evolved over more than a century of 
shifting priorities and jurisdictional conflicts. 
In writing this report, we have sought to present the 
essential policy elements and the overall institutional 
framework that shape resource use in the Basin.  In 
many instances, we will provide broad brush strokes 
covering basic information on a State by State basis 
and then as information permits, focus on the 
institutional arrangements which provide unique 
insights.  Some States have more documentation 
available on particular issues of water management 
such as water pricing (New South Wales), water 
trading (Victoria and New South Wales) and 
community involvement (South Australia).  
Consequently, the focus of the paper will shift to the 
State or institution from which information and 
insights are most readily drawn. 
In preparing the report we were mindful of the four 
key areas of the Asian Development Bank￿s Policy on 
Water which include: 
•  National level water policy and its basic 
framework (policies, guidelines and institutions of 
water resource management); 
•  Policies on integrated water resource management 
on the basis of river basins; 
•  Policies on service delivery of water resources by 
self-sustained service providers (separate from 
institutions engaged in resource management 
functions); and 
•  Policies on effective use and conservation of water. 
This report is being written at a time when major 
reforms are underway across sectors of the Australian Final Report 
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economy, including water.  As a result, this report 
provides a snap shot of where the States, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Commonwealth 
government are currently positioned in the reform 
process and, where possible, we will provide 
indications of where the process is expected to 
proceed.  
We would like to thank the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission for their permission to use some of their 
graphic images in this report.  The MDBC is not liable 
for any loss or damage incurred through the use of 
the images provided. 
In preparing the final report, sections of the report 
were sent to outside experts to check for accuracy. 
Remaining errors and omissions are the responsibility 
of the authors. Final Report 
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1.  INTRODUCTION TO THE MURRAY-
DARLING BASIN 
Overview of the Basin 
The Murray-Darling River Basin comprises a large 
geographical area, approximately one million square 
kilometres or approximately one-seventh of the land 
mass of Australia.  With a total length of 3 780 km, it 
is the fourth longest river system in the world. The 
total area is roughly equivalent to the area of France.  
An overview of the Murray-Darling River can be seen 
in Figure 1.1 
Figure 1.1 
Map of Australia with State Lines and the Outline of 
the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
Legend:    WA ￿ Western Australia 
    NT ￿ Northern Territory 
  Qld  ￿  Queensland 
  VIC  ￿  Victoria 
    NSW ￿ New South Wales 
    SA ￿ South Australia 
    ACT ￿ Australian Capital Territory 
Source:  GIS map, CSIRO 
The Murray-Darling River Basin contains half the 
Great Dividing Range and some of Australia￿s highest 
mountains.  The high catchments provide a significant 
amount of water to the system.  However, much of 
the basin is flat with extensive plains or low 
undulating areas less than 200 metres above sea level.   
The Basin covers 75% of the State of New South 
Wales, 56% of the State of Victoria, 15% of the State of Final Report 
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Queensland, 8% of the State of South Australia and 
the entire Australian Capital Territory (Murray-
Darling Ministerial Council, 1987) 
To provide an overview of the geography of the 
Basin, a series of maps from the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission have been assembled.  Figure 1.2 below 
provides an indication of the location of communities 
and developments along the major rivers within the 
Basin.   
Figure 1.2 
Overview of the southern portion Murray-Darling 




The River Murray system consists of the main course 
of the River Murray and all its anabranches, 
tributaries entering the River Murray upstream of 
Albury.  A number of works have been put in place - Final Report 
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Dartmouth Dam, Hume Dam, Yarrawonga Weir, 
Lake Victoria storage, the Menindee Lakes storage, 
the weirs and locks along the River Murray and lower 
Murrumbidgee, as well as the barrages near the 
mouth of the River Murray. 
The Murray-Darling Basin has been transformed by 
the construction of major water storages on the rivers 
over the last 100 years.  In Figure 1.3 the weirs, locks 
and storages are highlighted.  As well the location of 
hydro-electrical power station (Snowy River Scheme) 
are indicated. 
Figure 1.3 
Overview of the Infrastructure in the Murray-Darling 
Basin 
Source:  http://www.mdbc.gov.au 
The total volume of water storage capacity in the 
Basin is just less than 35 000 million litres. The major 
storages, especially Dartmouth, Hume, Lake Victoria 
and the Menindee Lakes and other river regulatory 
structures have made it possible to store water during 
wet periods and release it as needed during summer 
or in droughts. Final Report 
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Figure 1.4 
Map of Important agricultural and environmental 
locations in the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/tour/tour.htm 
Figure 1.4 highlights the areas of agricultural and 
environmental importance.  The Basin has been 
populated an estimated 40 000 years and there are 
significant sites where cave painting and artefacts of 
Aboriginal culture have been found.  As well, the 
Basin is important as a place of recreation and 
tourism.  The City of Adelaide with a population of 
over 1 million people draws an average of 40% of its 
water needs from the Murray system. 
There are a large number of wetlands throughout the 
Basin and some of which are considered to be of 
international significance and listed as Ramsar 
Wetlands. The Basin provides the breeding habitats 
for many species of waterbirds, fish, invertebrates and 
plants.  
MDBC http://www.mdbc.gov.au/tour/riverine.htm) 
Dryland regions comprise 90% of the Murray-Darling 
Basin￿s land area. The importance of the Basin to Final Report 
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Australian agriculture is evident by the fact that 43% 
of the total number of farms in Australia are in the 
Basin representing 45% of the  crop area. (MDBC 
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/tour/dryland.htm). Within the 
agricultural sector, crops, pastures and grasses are the 
largest value component of agricultural production in 
the Basin, with a gross value of $7.9 Billion (Australia 
Bureau of Statistics). 
Within the Murray-Darling Basin there are areas 
where irrigation dominates the landscape. Irrigated 
crops and pastures in the Basin represent 72% of 
Australia￿s total area of irrigated land. Irrigation is 
essential for improved dairy, cotton, rice and 
horticulture (in particular viticulture). 
(MDBC http://www.mdbc.gov.au/tour/irrigation.htm) 
Water Resources in the Basin 
One of the more remarkable features of the Murray-
Darling Basin is the variability that is observed. 
Within the Basin, rainfall varies from 1400mm per 
year in the highlands to 300 mm in the northwest. 
(Murray-Darling Ministerial Council, 1987)  
Australia’s climate, compounded by the variability of 
its rainfall, means that virtually all of Australia’s river 
systems are subject to considerable variability of flows 
from one year to another. According to Brennan and 
Scoccimarro (1998) annual variations from maximum 
to minimum flows range from 300:1 to 1000:1 in 
Australia.  Extremes of 10000:1 have been reported for 
the Darling River.  Figure 1.5 demonstrates with the 
Hume Reservoir how the natural inflows can vary 
from season to season but also year to year despite the 
fact that the Murray-Darling Basin is highly 
regulated.   The Northern ￿Darling￿ system is 
essentially a summer rain fall system, while the 
southern ￿Murray￿ system is essentially a winter 
rainfall system. Final Report 
13 
Policy and Economic Research Unit 
CSIRO Land and Water 
Figure 1.5 





The Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers experience 
relatively more reliable precipitation and as a result 
stream flow is much more reliable than in other parts 
of the Basin. The largest variability seems to occur 
with the Darling River and its tributaries where 
massive floods can occur as well as times when the 
rivers cease to flow.1 
 
Diversion of water from the Snowy River Catchment 
into the Murray System is an important feature.  This 
has enabled the development of a large hydro-electric 
power generation system during the 1950￿s much 
more irrigation than otherwise would have been the 
case.  Controversially, people living in the Snowy 
Catchment are now arguing for some of this water to 
be returned to them. 
                                                 
1 Water flow becomes an issue later in the report when we 
discuss security of water allocations. Final Report 
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Figure 1.6 
Major River Basin and Annual Discharge 
(Source: http://www.mdbc.gov.au/education/Encyclopedia/Surface_Water 
/Surface_Water_Resources.htm) 
Figure 1.6 provides an overview of the discharge from 
major rivers in the Basin. The Murray-Darling Basin 
has a relatively low mean annual discharge in 
comparison with the other river systems in the world; 
in fact it is a small one in terms of discharge or runoff.  
Geo-political Organisation of the Basin 
The previous section highlighted the unique physical 
characteristics of the Murray-Darling Basin.  Due to 
the geographic size of the Basin, it crosses the 
boundaries of States and one Territory.   The Murray-
Darling River Basin is managed by individual States 
but there are overarching bodies that coordinate 
many of the efforts of State and territory governments Final Report 
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at the basin level2.  It must be understood that 
Australia is a commonwealth of States and Territories.  
The Commonwealth Constitution says very little 
about water per say and thus it is largely under the 
jurisdiction of the States and Territory governments.  
Rather than amending the Constitution, a Murray-
Darling Basin Commission has been formed to 
manage inter-jurisdictional processes and conflicts in 
an organised manner. 
The Commonwealth (or Federal) government does 
participate in water and water resource management 
through other means such as legislative and executive 
capacity, including financial assistance to States and 
Territories as deemed appropriate by parliament 
under section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution 
(Fisher 2000, p.35).   Financial incentives must not be 
shown to discriminate between States.  This is a form 
of cooperative federalism where the Commonwealth 
and State governments come to agreements (financial 
incentives may be involved) and the Commonwealth 
relies on the States to implement agreements within 
their respective jurisdictions.  
As a result of the Constitutional framework, different 
bodies of legislation and institutional arrangements 
have evolved in each of the States.  To follow the 
elaborate layers of committees, management groups 
and other arrangements that are necessary to manage 
the Basin (and other resources in Australia), it is 
necessary to introduce the key important bodies that 
shape Commonwealth, State and Territorial 
government policy.  The institutional arrangements in 
the Basin are in a process of evolution as the States 
and Territories move towards market based systems 
of resource allocation. 
An overarching policy, which affects most sectors of 
the Australian economy, is the National Competition 
Policy.  The States, Territories and the 
Commonwealth have committed to a process of 
creating a level playing field for all by facilitating 
effective competition.  The goal of this process is to 
promote economic efficiency and economic growth.  
The policies are articulated in what has become 
known as the Hilmer report on National Competition. 
                                                 
2 A river basin is defined as the area within which all 
surface water flows towards a common low point.  Final Report 
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In order to facilitate these competitive reforms, the 
Commonwealth government has placed funds in a 
pool to be distributed among States and Territories on 
the basis of progress of implementing reform (each 
step is known as a Tranche).  Thus, States and 
Territories have a financial incentive to implement the 
policy framework.  The size of payments promised 
varies among States.  The payments are not large 
enough to finance reform but are sufficient to ensure 
that serious steps are taken to implement the reforms 
required. 
Council of Australian Governments 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
predates the National Competition Policy.  
Cooperation among the States to achieve agreed upon 
goals has required that entities such as COAG exist. 
COAG is charged with implementing principles of the 
Hilmer Report, including water reform. 
COAG is comprised of heads of Federal 
(Commonwealth of Australia) and State/Territory 
governments plus a representative from local 
government.  Water is one of many sectors that come 
under the preview of COAG. 
COAG has developed a national policy called the 
COAG Water Reform Framework for the efficient and 
sustainable reform of Australia’s rural and urban 
water industries.   In developing its framework, 
COAG adopted a position which required a consistent 
approach to water reform throughout Australia.  The 
key elements of COAG￿s water reforms are:  
1.  All water pricing is to be based on the 
principles of full cost recovery and 
transparency of  cross-subsidies;   
2.  Any future new investment in 
irrigation schemes, or extensions to 
existing schemes, are to be 
undertaken only after appraisal 
indicates it is economically viable and 
ecologically sustainable;  
3.  States and Territory governments, 
through relevant agencies, are to 
implement comprehensive systems of 
water allocations or entitlements, 
which are to be backed by the Final Report 
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separation of water property rights 
from land and include clear 
specification of entitlements in terms 
of ownership, volume, reliability, 
transferability and, if appropriate, 
quality; 
4.  The formal determination of water 
allocation entitlements, including 
allocations for the environment as a 
legitimate user of water; 
5.  Trading, including cross border sales, 
of water allocations and entitlements 
within the social or physical and 
ecological constraints of catchments;  
6.  An integrated catchment 
management approach to water 
resource management be adopted; 
7.  The separation, as far as possible, of 
resource management and regulatory 
roles of government from water 
service provision; 
8.  Greater responsibility at the local 
level for the management of water 
resources; 
9.  Greater public education about water 
use and consultation in the 
implementation of water reforms; and 
appropriate research into water use 
efficiency technologies and related 
areas. 
Source:http://www.affa.gov.au/water-reform/facts2.htm  
Each State and Territory was given the flexibility to 
adopt its own approach to implementation depending 
on its own unique institutional and natural 
characteristics, but agreed that the full framework 
would be implemented by the year 2001.  A package 
of diverse but interrelated requirements developed 
within the framework, and covering both urban and 
rural areas, is designed to generate an economically 
viable and ecologically sustainable water industry.  A 
key feature of the COAG framework was a State and 
Territory agreement to a tranche payment system, 
where access to very large payments was conditional 
upon delivery of reform milestones. Final Report 
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COAG Water Reform process is being further 
developed by the High Level Steering Group on 
Water.  This group consists of the chief executives of 
water resource management agencies.  The head of 
MDBC is not represented on the High Level Steering 
Group on Water but its members with a few 
exceptions, are members of the Commission. 
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council  
The Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
(MDBMC) was established in 1985 with amendments 
to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement.  Information 
flows between the Ministerial Council and the 
Council of Australian Governments as appropriate on 
matters relating to the implementation of the 
framework for water reform. 
The Ministerial Council consists of the ministers 
responsible for land, water and environmental 
resources in each of the signatory or contracting 
governments, the Commonwealth, New South Wales, 
South Australia, Victoria, and Queensland, with each 
government limited to a maximum of three members.  
An Australian Capital Territory government Minister 
may participate in the deliberations of the Council but 
not in its decision-making.  The chair of the 
Ministerial Council is traditionally the 
Commonwealth Agriculture Minister.  The prime 
functions of the Ministerial Council are: 
generally to consider and determine major policy issues of 
common interest to the Contracting governments 
concerning effective planning and management for the 
equitable efficient and sustainable use of the water, land 
and other environmental resources of the Murray-Darling 
Basin; and to develop, consider and, where appropriate, to 
authorise measures for the equitable, efficient and 
sustainable use of such water, land and other 
environmental resources . (Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement 1992, Clause 9) 
Being a political forum, the Ministerial Council has 
the power to make decisions for the Basin as a whole 
because of the presence of Ministers representing each 
of the States and Territory.  Resolutions of the Council 
are usually through a consensus decision-making 
approach and in theory represents a consensus of 
governmental opinion and policy across the Basin.  Final Report 
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BASIN SUSTAINABILITY WATER
BUSINESS
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council
Ministers holding land, water and environment portfolios in each contracting Government
(Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland)*
Murray-Darling Basin Commission
Independent President, Commissioners/Deputy Commissioners
representing each contracting Government (senior executives from
land, water and environment agencies)*
Community Advisory Committee



















Commission Office: technical and support staff
Principal Government Agencies
(Commonwealth, NSW, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, ACT)*
Community
* Participation of the Australian Capital Territory is via a memorandum of understanding
However the Ministerial Council relies on the States 
to implement any decisions taken. 
An overview of the high level organisation of 
Murray-Darling Basin can be seen in Figure 1.7. The 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission is discussed in 
some detail below.  This organisational chart 
highlights how the State and Commonwealth 
governments coordinate their efforts to provide a 
high level structure that is responsible for the Basin.  
However, within this high level structure there is still 
a place made for a Community Advisory Committee.  
The committee serves as a two way communication 
channel between the Ministerial Council and 
communities living in the Basin.  This is a consistent 
feature of most of the resource management bodies in 
Australia (MBDC 2000).   
The first two tiers of the structure have been stable for 
many years, but the third tier of project boards, policy 
committees, etc, changes regularly.  The 
Commission￿s staffing structure was changed 
radically in 1999. 
Figure 1.7 
Overview of the Organisation of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Source: http://www.mdbc.gov.au/about/governance/overview.htm#fig1 
 Final Report 
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Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
The Commission is the executive arm of the Murray-
Darling Basin Ministerial Council.  It also works 
cooperatively with the States.  The Commission is 
responsible for managing the River Murray and the 
Menindee Lakes system of the lower Darling River 
and advising the Ministerial Council on matters 
related to the use of the water, land and other 
environmental resources of the Murray-Darling Basin.  
The Commission is an autonomous organisation 
equally responsible to the governments represented 
on the Ministerial Council as well as to the Council 
itself. It is a rather unusual entity in that it is neither a 
government department nor a statutory body of any 
individual government.  A history of the Commission 
is in Appendix I. 
The Commission has a couple of key functions that 
include: 
•  advising the Ministerial Council in relation to the 
planning, development and management of the 
Basin￿s natural resources;  
•  assisting the Council in developing measures for 
the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of the 
Basin￿s natural resources;  
•  coordinating the implementation of, or where 
directed by Council, to implement those measures; 
and  
•  giving effect to any policy or decision of the 
Ministerial Council.  
The Commission must balance equity considerations 
as well as manage and distribute the water resources 
of the River Murray in accordance with the Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement. 
The Commission began with a mandate to manage 
water quantity that has gradually extended to include 
water quality issues and, to a limited extent, related 
land resource management issues.  In the late 1980￿s, 
it was given a mandate to initiate, support and 
evaluate integrated natural resources management 
across the Murray-Darling Basin. 
The Commission comprises an independent 
President, two Commissioners from each contracting 
government (ie the Commonwealth, New South Final Report 
21 
Policy and Economic Research Unit 
CSIRO Land and Water 
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland) and 
a representative of the Australian Capital Territory 
government.  Each contracting government also has 
two deputy Commissioners and the ACT has one 
deputy representative.  Apart from the President, 
Commissioners are normally chief and senior 
executives of the agencies responsible for 
management of land, water and environmental 
resources. 
The Commission must work in cooperation with the 
partner governments, committees and community 
groups to develop and implement policies and 
programs.  This cooperative approach reflects the 
Constitutional reality and the importance placed on 
Government-community partnerships and brings to 
participants and end-users the benefit of shared 
concerns and expertise, jointly developed and 
integrated solutions, and avoids duplication of effort.  
(http://www.mdbc.gov.au/about/about_mdbc/the_commissio
n.html) 
Other Committees Involved in Water Reforms 
There are a couple of key ministerial committees3 that 
have been charged with putting the policy framework 
in place in each State and territory in line with COAG 
reforms.  Two groups in particular, Agriculture and 
Resource Management Council of Australian and 
New Zealand (ARMCANZ), Australian and New 
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 
(ANZECC), have provided policy directions in 
relation to water needs for agriculture and the 
environment.  These Ministerial committees are 
supported by Standing Committees of senior officials 
whose main task is to advise the Ministerial 
Committees and supervise working groups, etc who 
develop policy proposals.  Standing Committee 
members are usually heads of department although 
they sometimes need to send a representative.  The 
key standing committees are the: 
                                                 
3 Under the Australian system of government, ultimate 
responsibility for policy implementation rests with a Minister.  
To be a Minister, one must first be elected to Parliament and then 
selected for a position in Cabinet.   Departments are constrained 
and guided by legislation and are subject to the direction and 
control of a Minister. Final Report 
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•  Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource 
Management (SCARM); 
•  Standing Committee on Environmental Protection 
(SCEP); 
•  Standing Committee on Conservation (SCC). 
Very few significant changes in water policy occur 
without at least, informal discussion at SCARM. 
Working together these two bodies have put forth 
guidelines on how these needs should be met in the 
broader context of water allocation.  The goal for 
providing water for the environment is to sustain and 
where necessary restore ecological processes and 
biodiversity of water dependent ecosystems.  The 
principles are as follows:  
1.  River regulation and/or consumptive use 
should be recognised as potentially impacting 
on ecological values. 
2.   Provision of water for ecosystems should be 
on the basis of the best scientific information 
available on the water regimes necessary to 
sustain the ecological values of water 
dependent ecosystems.  
3.  Environmental water provisions should be 
legally recognised.  
4.  In systems where there are existing users, 
provision of water for ecosystems should go 
as far as possible to meet the water regime 
necessary to sustain the ecological values of 
aquatic ecosystems whilst recognising the 
existing rights of other water users.  
5.  Where environmental water requirements 
cannot be met due to existing uses, action 
(including re-allocation) should be taken to 
meet environmental needs.  
6.  Further allocation of water for any use should 
only be on the basis that natural ecological 
processes and biodiversity are sustained (i.e. 
ecological values are sustained) 
7.  Accountabilities in all aspects of management 
of environmental water provisions should be 
transparent and clearly defined. 
8.  Environmental water provisions should be 
responsive to monitoring and improvements Final Report 
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in understanding of environmental water 
requirements. 
9.  All water uses should be managed in a 
manner which recognises ecological values. 
10. Appropriate demand management and water 
pricing strategies should be used to assist in 
sustaining ecological values of water 
resources. 
11. Strategic and applied research to improve 
understanding of environmental water 
requirements is essential.  
12. All relevant environmental, social and 
economic stakeholders will be involved in 
water allocation, planning and decision 
making on environmental water provisions. 
ARMCANZ and ANZECC are forums for 
government ministers to coordinate efforts.  The High 
Level Steering Group on Water, which consists of 
department heads, provides the ties between 
government agencies and the policy setting 
committees such as ARMCANZ and ANZECC.  There 
are a number of other committees which involve 
lower level government officials where the details 
concerning how to implement these policies are 
worked out.  The committees have been key in 
implementing reforms concerning full cost pricing 
and the creation of the environment for the 
competitive provision of water. 
Coordination of Various Agencies 
Coordination is achieved via a constellation of 
Councils and inter-related bodies.  There are links 
between COAG, ARMCANZ and ANZECC through 
the ministers who are members of cabinet.  
Agreements entered into by the States will necessarily 
reflect approval by the Ministers who sit in Cabinet. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission is also an 
important point of coordination.  Each year, each 
State develops a three-year rolling plan that outlines 
the outcomes to be achieved against Basin 
sustainability objectives in the management regions.  
The management regions correspond to the 
catchments in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia.  A consolidated three-year rolling 
investment plan, based on State plans, then provides a Final Report 
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summary of the investments being made across the 
Basin. This allows for some evaluation of progress 
towards goals. 
KEY HIGHLIGHT 
Even though the Basin crosses numerous 
jurisdictions, forums can be set up for high level 
officials to come together and make decisions for the 
Basin.  In Australia, there is a recognition that States 
must work together on resource management issues.  
The process works because the institutions have 
evolved especially to resolve issues.  
Characteristically, new agenda issues are approached 
by setting a vision and then negotiating the detail 
once the vision is agreed.  A second feature, not 
transparent to the lay observer, is the complex web of 
people involved.  It is common for many of the 
Commissioners to Chair subcommittees, sit on the 
High Level Steering Group for Water, and be the head 
of a natural resource management department.  These 
same people also interact through Committee 
processes, like ARMCANZ, ANZECC, etc. Final Report 
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2.  WATER POLICIES 
How to Share the Water 
In the Murray-Darling River Basin of Australia, water 
is used for passive, environmental and consumptive 
purposes.  Consumption includes household use, 
irrigation and water for livestock.   Historically, access 
to the Murray-Darling Basin began with a framework 
that enabled virtually who ever wanted to use water 
for consumptive purposes to do so.  Moreover, most 
of the infrastructure used to deliver water was paid 
for by governments and supplied at subsidised prices.  
The combination of drought and water quality has 
become a significant issue for waters users 
throughout the Basin.  Events such as droughts, algae 
blooms and increases in salinity provided impetus for 
renegotiating how to share the water in Murray-
Darling Basin. Views on the situation are coloured by 
location in the Basin.  Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria are ￿upstream States￿ and South Australia is 
a ￿downstream￿State.  
Priorities amongst Users 
In general across States, the consumption of water by 
people and animals is the highest priority followed by 
agriculture.  Most water licences and legislation 
indicates that water needed for domestic purposes 
and livestock production is a prior right.  That is, 
people may not interfere with the rights of people to 
do this in a reasonable manner. 
The importance of the environment has been 
acknowledged by the Council of Australian 
Governments.  News releases, as reported by 
Marsden Jacob Associates (1999), indicate the 
Commonwealth government￿s plan is to continue the 
water reform process by: 
￿legislating to ensure that flows needed to restore 
adequate river health continue to have a prior right 
over provision of water for consumptive use. (MJA 
p.27) 
However, where in the list of priorities the 
environment is actually placed is not always well 
defined.  An example is the Corporatisation of the 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority, Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) released by the 
Commonwealth (Industry, Science and Resources).  Final Report 
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The EIS outlines how water levels in the Snowy River 
might be restored through water savings in the 
Murray-Darling but 
[r]ather than recommending specific trade-offs between 
economic and environmental interests, or between 
competing environmental interests, the EIS has sought 
to compare and contrast the various advantages and 
disadvantages for each group of stakeholders of 
reducing water releases to the Murray-Darling Basin 
in order to provide increased flows in the Snowy River. 
 (p.2 Draft EIS) 
This reluctance indicates the difficulties that 
governments, communities and businesses face in 
placing the environment in a list of priorities.  COAG 
through the High Level Steering Group on Water has 
released draft guidelines on the allocation of water to 
the environment. 
However there have been steps forward.  The 
Barmah-Millewa Forest now has its own 
environmental allocation. The Barmah section of the 
forest is a Ramsar wetlands indicating that this is a 
site of international importance.  (MDBC 1999).  In 
October 1998, the Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
released 97 GL of water from the Hume Dam to 
achieve environmental benefits for Barmah-Millewa 
Forest and to supplement flows from the Owens River 
to promote tree growth and improve bird and fish 
habitat 
All levels of government have committed themselves 
to an Inter-Governmental Agreement on the 
Environment.  This agreement commits them to a set 
of principles designed to ensure that all resource use 
and development in Australia is ecologically 
sustainable.  Further, the Commonwealth and State 
governments endorsed the National Strategy for 
Ecological Sustainable Development in 1992 which 
has three core principles: 
•  to enhance individual and community well-being by 
following a path of economic development that 
safeguards the welfare of future generations 
•  to provide for equity within and between 
generations 
•  to protect biological diversity and maintain essential 
ecological processes and life-support systems. Final Report 
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In summary, governments have begun to express a 
need to give greater priority to the environment and 
are now trying to implement this objective.  Indicative 
of this change in emphasis, the New South Wales 
government recently reduced most irrigation 
allocations by 10% so that ￿allocations￿ to the 
environment could be increased. The City of 
Adelaide, outside the Basin, also has priority.  
Adelaide receives about 40% of its drinking water 
from the River Murray.  As yet, the City has not had 
to purchase any additional amount over its allocation 
to meet its water needs. 
Finally in the list of priorities, there is some industrial 
use of water in the Basin.  Examples of industrial use 
include food and beverage processing, textiles and 
tobacco.  As well, there is some mining that occurs in 
the Basin. 
Historical Use of the Basin 
The basis for allocating water across States is largely 
the product of historical use.  New South Wales and 
Victoria have engaged in intensive agriculture since 
the turn of the century and the pattern of use can be 
seen in Figure 2.1.   
Figure 2.1 
Historical Use of the Murray-Darling Basin by the 
States Projections as of 1995 without a Cap 
Source:  MDBMC (2000) Final Report 
28 
Policy and Economic Research Unit 
CSIRO Land and Water 
Sharing Water among States 
Through the 1980s, the amount of water being 
diverted from the Basin began to increase 
significantly.  In 1993, a decision was made by the 
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) 
to prepare a water audit.  The audit would: 
•  Establish water use in the Basin; 
•  Describe current level of development; 
•  Document recent trends; and 
•  Assess the implications of those trends. 
The MDBMC was concerned about the health of the 
Basin.  Water salinity was increasing, algal blooms 
were occurring more frequently and biodiversity 
appeared to be declining.  For the downstream State 
of South Australia, the situation was thought to be 
becoming serious. 
It was acknowledged by the MDBMC that water 
usage could not continue to increase within the 
Murray-Darling Water Basin.  As a result, an overall 
Cap on water diversions has been introduced, 
limiting the volume of water to what would have 
been diverted under 1993-94 levels of development. 
This does not mean that the amount of water is 
capped at 1993-94 levels but: 
￿rather, the Cap in any year is the volume of water 
that would have been used with the infrastructure 
(pumps, dams, channels, areas developed for irrigation, 
management rules, etc.) and management rules that 
existed in 1993/94, assuming similar climatic and 
hydrological conditions to those experienced in the year 
in question.  Thus, the Cap provides scope for greater 
water use in certain years and lower use in other years. 
(Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council 2000 
p.3) 
Perhaps, the most dramatic impact of the Cap has 
been an increase in water trading and, also, the value 
of water. 
The Cap on a State by State Basis 
 New South Wales and Victoria 
For New South Wales and Victoria, the Cap is set at 
the volume of water that would have been diverted 
under 1993/94 levels of development.  In the NSW Final Report 
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Border Rivers valley, the Cap allowance for enlarged 
Pindari Dam has not been determined. The Cap 
allowance for the Lake Mokan development has not 
been determined.  Although Cap targets vary from 
year the long term cap is about 6000 GL for New 
South Wales and about 4000 GL for Victoria. 
 South Australia   
In contrast to New South Wales and Victoria, South 
Australia has opted for a lower but more secure level 
supply of water.  The Cap in South Australia is 
defined in terms of components: 
•  A fixed allocation of 50GL per year for 
country towns 
•  A five year non-tradeable, rolling allocation 
of 650 GL for metropolitan Adelaide 
An average 524 GL per year allocation for irrigation 
including private, industrial, recreation, environment, 
stock and domestic purposes. South Australia has 
effectively capped State consumption to the allocation 
levels in 1992. 
Queensland 
Cap limits for Queensland have yet to be determined.  
The State is in the process of preparing water 
allocation management plans (WAMPs) and water 
management plans (WMPs) for the catchments in the 
Murray-Darling Basin.  There is a moratorium on 
issuing new licences while the concerns of 
Queensland are being negotiated and plans are being 
put in place.  The amount of water being diverted is 
relatively small in comparison to New South Wales 
and Victoria.  
Australian Commonwealth Territory 
A proposal on Cap limits for the Australian 
Commonwealth Territory and a proposal for water 
trading with New South Wales is forthcoming.  The 
ability to trade water is necessary for the Australian 
Commonwealth Territory to be confident in 
establishing a Cap limit. 
MDBMC (1996) 
Accountability 
Through the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement and 
the agreements by COAG, there are periodic audits of Final Report 
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compliance to the Cap on water diversions.  Water 
allocation plans are becoming statutory documents 
that are prepared at the local level.  States are held 
accountable for these decisions made.  For this reason, 
there are links all the way up through the 
administrative layers. 
The National Competition Policy has required State 
and Territories to demonstrate compliance with 
reforms (including water reforms) as agreed by the 
COAG.  In order to receive Tranche payments, States 
and Territories have had to report on their progress in 
introducing reforms.  The State of Queensland faced a 
reduction in their second Tranche payment.  Last 
minute negotiations and a commitment to reform 
resulted in Queensland receiving the full payment. 
Threats to the Cap 
The Cap limits by State represent what could be 
negotiated at the time.  It is still not clear how the 
developments such as the enlarged Pindari Dam and 
the Lake Mokan development will fit under the Cap.  
Negotiations to get the Australian Commonwealth 
Territory and Queensland to agree to diversions 
under the Cap are considered important, as 
exemption of either of these institutions would 
undermine the public perception that all parties were 
subject to limits. This has the potential to lead to 
water users questioning why they must adhere to 
limits.  Industry organisations opposed to the Cap 
have been running a ￿Zap-the-Cap￿ campaign. 
There is a difficult trade-off when setting a Cap in an 
environment of cooperative federalism ￿ 
comprehensiveness versus length of negotiations.  In 
order to obtain agreement on the Cap, contentious 
issues such as ground water and farm diversions 
(farm dams) were not included.  Since the 
introduction of the Cap, there has been an increase in 
farm dams and increased pressure on ground water 
stocks.  It is hoped that the Cap may be extended and 
agreement achieved with the States and Australian 
Capital Territory on these issues. Final Report 
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KEY HIGHLIGHT 
Setting aside water for the environment is probably 
the most difficult aspect of setting priorities for water 
use.  Experience in the Basin is revealing that a formal 
cap on water use is a necessary step in the 
development of efficient and sustainable water use 
policies.  Experience is also showing the importance 
of allocating water to the environment or clearly 
defining allocation rules well before the quantity of 
water available for consumptive use is fully 
committed. 
￿Loopholes￿ in the comprehensiveness of a Cap on 
diversions has the potential to undermine confidence 
in the system.  When commitment is less than 
complete, water users start to question why they must 
adhere to limits. Final Report 
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3.  WATER LAWS 
Within the Commonwealth of Australia, each State 
and Territory has responsibility for legislation 
concerning water resources. Each State in the Murray-
Darling Basin has been moving towards defining 
property rights regarding water and separating water 
rights from land title.  The purpose of this process is 
to facilitate the development of trade in water within 
and among States and the Australian Commonwealth 
Territory.  There is considerable variation among 
States regarding property rights in water and some 
differences are given as examples below. 
Water Legislation concerning Different Sources of 
Water 
Surface water is the most important source of water 
for users in the Basin.  Potential problems with 
groundwater are less visible but are emerging as an 
issue in various States.  As a result, initiatives such as 
the New South Wales Groundwater Policy 
Framework will be considered here because it is 
interesting and innovative.  
New South Wales 
New South Wales has recently passed new legislation 
for water resource management.  The new act will 
replace the Water Administration Act 1986, the Water 
Act 1912 and other pieces of legislation.  New South 
Wales issued a white paper and went through an 
extensive process of consultation with this legislation. 
The use, flow of and control of surface water, 
groundwater, coastal waters and water in the water 
works system comes under this new Act.  The Water 
Management Act is concerned with setting out the 
rules for catchment management in contrast to the 
Water Act of 1912 that was designed to facilitate rural 
agricultural development. 
New South Wales has issued The NSW State 
Groundwater Policy Framework Document.  
Groundwater can be found in most areas of NSW but 
it varies widely in terms of quality, its recharge 
potential, vulnerability to pollution, and its 
connection to surface waters and other systems. The 
policy framework States that development of 
groundwater resources must occur on an ecologically 
sustainable basis.  Further as much is unknown about Final Report 
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groundwater resources, the precautionary principle 
will prevail.  The precautionary principle is: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environment damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
(Department of Land and Water Conservation 
1997, p.13) 
In New South Wales, the development of 
Groundwater Management Plans will provide the 
policy framework for how groundwater should be 
accessed.  In locations where there are conflicting 
interests or the resource is vulnerable, stakeholder 
involvement will be used to resolve the trade-off 
between economic, social and environmental 
objectives. 
The functions of the Minister are largely carried out 
by the Department of Land and Water Conservation.4  
Access to surface water and groundwater is regulated 
by way of licences in New South Wales.  Private 
individuals and government agencies must apply for 
a licence under the Water Management Act 1986. 
The importance of setting the rules carefully with 
respect to ground water can be demonstrated with an 
example.  Over much of New South Wales, new 
licenses were issued for "unused water" without 
cancelling undeveloped licenses.  In retrospect, this 
has proved an administrative disaster because the 
total volume of licences issued is well in excess of 
estimated sustained yield in a number of areas.  In 
one of the worst cases, the Namoi Valley, a 
complicated process is now underway to work out 
how to equitably introduce water trading in areas 
where large allocations of water have never been 
used.  In one zone over 50 GL of water have been 
allocated, average use is around 20 GL and estimated 
sustained yield is 12.5 GL.  Those with large unused 
allocations are calling for a pro-rata cut across all 
allocations.  Irrigators who have been using ￿all￿ their 
allocation regard this as extremely inequitable.  Most 
users tend to be of the view that government is 
responsible for the errors made and should be forced 
                                                 
4 Ultimate responsibility remains with the Minister under the 
Australian system of governance. Final Report 
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to compensate irrigators for water that is not or no 
longer available to them. 
Victoria 
Under the Water Act 1989, the Crown has the right to 
the use, flow and control of all water in a waterway 
and all groundwater.  Under the Act, an Authority 
can apply for a licence for a bulk entitlement to 
groundwater, surface water or water in the works of 
another Authority, etc. 
South Australia 
In South Australia, areas are prescribed when intense 
development occurs and closer management is 
deemed to be appropriate.  Once an area is 
prescribed, taking groundwater or surface water 
requires a licence under the Water Resources Act 
1997.  Water Allocation Plans have been or are in the 
process of being prepared for each prescribed area.  
Formal provisions for the environment are to be made 
in the water allocation plans.  South Australia, 
differing from other States, has devolved much 
responsibility for water management to catchment 
boards with powers to levy water users and, to a 
limited extent, regulate land and water use practices. 
Australian Capital Territory 
The right to use and control all sources of water is 
vested with the Territory.  Generally, a licence is 
required to take water but there are some leases and 
interests in land where licences are not required.  
(Fisher 2000, p.101)  The Territory is very small and 
only a very small area is irrigated.  Virtually, all water 
is used for domestic purposes. 
Water Legislation concerning different Uses of 
Water 
Hydro-electric Power 
The Snowy Murray Development diverts water from 
the upper Snowy River through two power stations, 
through a pondage and then down the River Murray 
into a dam where it is then released for irrigation 
purposes.  Approximately 1200 GL is released into the 
River Murray on average. 
The right to water released from the reservoirs rests 
with New South Wales and Victoria which in turn Final Report 
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provide property rights to users through licences with 
varying degree of security.  The Snowy Murray 
Development does hold the right to ￿time￿ the release 
of water subject to a series of operating rules.  In order 
to generate power for a commercial electricity market, 
the storage and ability to release water at particular 
times is of critical importance.  
Irrigation 
New licences for irrigation water will be granted 
under the Water Management Act 2000 in New South 
Wales.  The Water Administration Ministerial 
Corporation, a trust, a privately managed scheme, or 
an irrigation corporation may provide water for 
irrigation. 
In Victoria, under the Water Act 1989, bulk 
entitlements are granted to water authorities which 
have specific functions and responsibilities within 
districts.  There are four types of districts (water 
supply, sewage, waterway management and 
irrigation) of which irrigation is one. The irrigation 
district receives water from the water authority.  The 
irrigation district provides and operates works for the 
purposes of delivering water for irrigation.  
Individual irrigators, however, are free to sell water 
within their district.  Trading among districts and 
interstate is being trialed. 
In South Australia, to access water for irrigation 
purposes in a prescribed area, the irrigator must have 
a license granted under the Water Resources Act 
1997.5  Much of the irrigated land in the Murray-
Darling Basin in South Australia is in a prescribed 
area.  This requires that a catchment management 
plan and a water allocation plan be prepared. 
In Queensland, licences for irrigation are granted 
under the Water Resources Act 1989.  However, there 
is currently a moratorium on new licences in 
Queensland until catchment plans are in place.  
As a general rule, water is more fully allocated in 
New South Wales than in Victoria or South Australia.  
One of the reasons often articulated for this is that 
                                                 
5 South Australia is reviewing whether activities which might 
effect recharge will require a licence for water.  Forestry 
plantations, as an example, would be required to hold a licence. Final Report 
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there are more permanent irrigation plantations, etc, 
in South Australia and Victoria. 
Consumption 
In New South Wales (Water Management Act 2000), 
Victoria (Water Act 1989) and Queensland (Water 
Resources Act 1989), the occupier of land is able to 
take and use water for domestic consumptive 
purposes without a licence.  Consumptive purposes 
also includes watering stock and irrigating home 
gardens or land for non-commercial purposes less 
than two hectares. 
South Australia (Water Resources Act 1997) has taken 
a different approach.   Under the Act, there is a 
prohibition against taking water from a prescribed 
area without a licence even for domestic purposes. 
The Australian Capital Territory has the same rules as 
New South Wales regarding consumptive use of 
surface water but all groundwater extraction requires 
a licence. (Fisher 2000)  All States are now in the 
process of introducing rules to control the size of farm 
dams that prevent water flowing into the Murray-
Darling and other systems. 
Environment 
To this point, water for the environment is vested 
with the Minister responsible for Water in each of the 
states.  Linkages between licences and other aspects of 
environmental protection are provided for through 
requirements for information to be exchanged 
between various government departments. 
In New South Wales, the new Act will provide a 
means for the Minister to adjust water entitlements to 
achieve particular environmental or health outcomes.  
Thus water for the environment will no longer be 
residual but will have a prior right. 
In Victoria, the bulk entitlement process is being used 
in regulated systems to convert poorly defined access 
rights to water of existing users to well defined rights 
consistent with the Water Act 1989.  Water authorities 
(this includes the major irrigators) apply to convert an 
existing use into a bulk entitlement.   This provides an 
opportunity to negotiate environmental flows.  
Victoria reported to the High Level Steering Group 
recently that in 73 bulk entitlement applications, 
enhanced environmental flows were negotiated in Final Report 
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87% of the cases (High Level Steering Group on 
Water, undated).  As well, when a bulk water 
entitlement is sought, the Minister responsible for the 
Water Act forwards a copy of the application to the 
Minister responsible for Conservation, Forest and 
Lands Act 1987 and Planning and the Environment 
Act 1987. This ensures coordination between 
departments. 
In South Australia, section 6 of the Water Resources 
Act 1997 States that development should occur only 
on an ecologically sustainable basis.  Where water 
resources are overcommitted, the Act gives the 
Minister the power to reduce water allocations of 
license holders. 
In all States, there is interest in allocating formal 
rights to the environment and then using market 
mechanisms to improve environmental outcomes. 
Linkages between Water and Water Related 
Resources 
In each State and Territory there is body of legislation 
affecting the management of the environment and the 
resources within it.  Most aspects of water 
management are covered by the respective pieces of 
water legislation.  However, there will be instances 
where other pieces of legislation come into effect.  In 
South Australia for instance, the following Acts have 
implications for water resource management: 
•  Environment Protection Act 1993 sets out the 
activities which require an environmental licence 
and examples include chemical storage and 
warehousing, sewage treatment and activities that 
produce particular types of waste.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency considers the 
impact that these activities are likely to have on 
the surface and groundwater systems. 
•  Under the Native Vegetation Act 1991, the 
Minister may enter into a heritage agreement with 
a landowner to protect native vegetation from 
clearing.  This Act protects important ecosystems 
on private land. 
•  Under the Soil and Landcare Act 1989 ￿ Soil 
conservation boards prepare plans regarding the 
classes into which the land falls, the preferred and 
actual uses of the land, the nature, causes, extent 
and severity of land degradation and the measures Final Report 
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that should be taken for rehabilitation of each 
particular type of degradation.  The board also 
encourages the property owners in the district to 
prepare property plans to deal with degradation. 
•  Local Government Act 1999 sets outs the authority 
for local governments for such things as the 
construction of drainages through private land 
and makes provisions for flood management.  The 
Act sets out the power for the Govenor to grant 
water reserves to Councils (local governments). 
•  The Development Act 1993 sets out the key 
elements of a Planning Strategy which may 
include planning principles relating to natural or 
constructed environments, ecologically sustainable 
development, the management or conservation of 
land, buildings, heritage places and heritage areas 
as well as the management, conservation and use 
of natural and other resources. 
As well, the Commonwealth government passed a 
package of legislation under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.  
Property Rights in Water 
Australia inherited a body of English common law 
regarding water rights.  Historically, property rights 
generally evolved in an ad hoc manner in reaction to 
specific circumstances and problems.  As settlement 
occurred and the need for comprehensive water law 
was required, the States began introducing legislation 
covering surface and ground water. 
Australia is in the midst of significant policy reform 
regarding property rights in water.  As a result, all 
States are in the process of changing legislative 
arrangements associated with water use and 
allocation. It is useful to review who the water users 
are in the Basin as the aspects of property rights 
which are valued tend to revolve around the use of 
the water.  There are four main uses of water in the 
Murray-Darling Basin including:   
•  Consumptive uses such irrigation, urban water 
supply, stock and domestic purposes in rural areas 
•  Hydro-electric power 
•  In-stream flows for the health of the river system  Final Report 
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•  Dilution flows which maintain water quality for 
downstream users 
Each State and Territory is at a different step in the 
process of defining property rights to water.  One of 
the important goals of the process is to facilitate more 
efficient trade in water so that adjustments by users 
under the Cap are made easier.  If this occurs then, it 
is reasoned, water will continue to be applied to its 
highest and best use.  The first step in this process 
involved separating the right to water from the land 
title.  In order to establish an effective market in water 
rights, careful definition of property rights with 
respect to water requires that rights be clearly 
delineated in terms of volume, security or reliability, 
transferability and quality.  Rights are typically 
defined for a period of years with an arrangement to 
facilitate their renewal before the old right expires. 
Defining property rights is complicated by several 
factors, some of which may be peculiar to the Murray-
Darling Basin. The variability of water flows (due to 
season and periodic drought) in the Basin results in 
property rights that are not readily defined in 
volumetric terms (Brennan and Scoccimaro, 1998).  In 
practice, the rights issued represent an entitlement to 
take a proportional share of water available for 
consumptive use within a defined security class.  
In all States, licences issued under each jurisdiction 
reflect the thinking at the time they were first issued.  
As a result, there is considerable inconsistency in 
licence conditions, rights, obligations and community 
perceptions.  All States are now in the process of 
modifying this situation so that trading is simpler.  
Separation of water from land title is also raising 
complex issues about ownership.  In some cases, the 
registered land title holder is not the same person or 
party as the holder of the water licence.  At present, 
legislation gives little guidance as to the most 
appropriate way to resolve such issues. 
The mechanisms for water delivery do not provide for 
perfect excludability and as a result there are potential 
problems with externalities created by users within 
the Basin.  For instance, irrigation may result in 
salinity as a result of excess water being used and the 
rising water tables bringing salt to the root zone and 
or the surface. Final Report 
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To this point, formal rights for the environment have 
not been clearly defined.  Ministers in each State and 
Territory have been able to divert water for the health 
of a river or ecosystem but these rights have been 
residual to other uses.  
An over view of the property rights or entitlements 
framework is provided below. 
Entitlement Framework in New South Wales 
The Water Management Act was recently passed in 
New South Walses and represents an innovative 
framework for water rights.  The Act will provide 
clarification of water rights.  An integrated approvals 
administration system will apply to regulated and 
unregulated surface water and ground water systems.  
Generally there will be a separation of water rights 
and land rights.  The new framework will tighten up 
the provision for extraction and use of water in New 
South Wales.  Landowners will continue to hold a 
basic right water for domestic and stock purposes. 
The Minister may introduce special management 
arrangements for domestic and stock use in ￿sensitive 
areas￿.  Access Entitlements will be categorised as 
follows: 
Category 1 ￿ Local and Major Urban Water Utilities  - 
These are high security fixed volume 20 year 
renewable licences. 
Category 2 ￿ High Security Regulated River 
Entitlements ￿ these high security entitlements were 
created in the past to provide virtually guaranteed 
access to water for permanent crops such as grapes 
and fruit trees.  These guarantees tend to be far in 
excess of what is actually required and future reviews 
of these entitlements have been foreshadowed.  There 
are severe difficulties with water availability and over 
commitment of water resources in some category 2 
areas. 
Category 3 ￿ Low Flow Unregulated River 
Entitlements ￿ The low flow entitlement (Class A) 
would provide the highest security in unregulated 
rivers. 
Category 4 ￿ General Security Regulated River and 
Groundwater Entitlements ￿ this category will include 
the general security irrigation and groundwater 
licences. Final Report 
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Category 5 & 6 ￿ Medium and High Flow 
Unregulated River Entitlements ￿ These entitlements 
(Class B & C) will provide access to water from an 
unregulated stream when the river flow exceeds a 
specified percentile flow level or other trigger level. 
The access rights described above can be traded 
subject to conditions and Ministerial approval. 
The proposed Water Management Act will allow for 
trades in water entitlements to occur intervalley and 
interstate.   
Entitlement Framework in Victoria 
The State of Victoria was the first State to emphasise 
the need to define property rights precisely as a 
prerequisite to market trading and to achieve efficient 
allocation.  The Water Act 1989 converted the rights of 
existing users who held existing licenses into bulk 
entitlements that specified the volume to be 
harvested, its security and the rate of harvesting 
(Cumming et al. 1995). 
Considerable efforts have been made to clarify the 
water entitlements in the State.  Bulk entitlements to 
water are being clarified for all the regulated water 
supply systems. These quantify the rights and 
obligations of water supply and power authorities to 
divert water, including rules for operating reservoirs 
and stream flows. In Victoria, Goulburn-Murray 
Water is seeking to further define the property rights 
of water retailers.  The process aims to provide choice 
in reliability of supply for farmers, to simplify the 
water trading market, and to remove unused 
entitlements from the marketplace. 
Entitlement Framework in South Australia 
Preparation of the Water Resources Act 1997 in South 
Australia coincided with the policy reforms being 
proposed by the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG).  The Act contains many of the key features 
agreed upon by COAG and is designed to show that 
the State is complying with COAG requirements.  In 
particular, there is 
•  Separation of the roles of water resource 
management, regulation and monitoring from the 
role as service provider.  All water users fall under 
this one Act. Final Report 
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•  Separation of water rights from land title. 
Water licences are fully transferable (permanently or 
temporarily) within ecological or other constraints. 
Pollution Control 
For reasons of public health, the legal system in 
Australia has protected water quality.  There is a 
general prohibition against permitting or causing 
activities resulting in the pollution of water without a 
licence.  In some instances, this may be treated as a 
criminal matter.  However, as part of the 
development of environmental protection legislation, 
a range of approaches to protection and enforcement 
are being employed. New South Wales has set out the 
most recent body of legislation through the Protection 
of the Environment Operations Act 1997.  This Act 
provides an integrated framework in: 
•  the creation of environmental protection policies, 
including standards,  
•  the licensing processes and  
•  the issuing of environmental protection notices as 
an enforcement mechanism.  
(Fisher 2000 pp.286-7) 
One of the purposes of the legislation in New South 
Wales is the prevention of pollution, promotion of 
cleaner production, reduction of discharges that are 
likely to be harmful to the environment and 
promotion of progressive environmental 
improvements. Contained in the legislation are the 
standards that are taken into consideration in 
approving a licence to pollute.  Licences may be 
granted subject to a series of conditions being met. 
The Environment Protection Act in Queensland 
represents a more traditional approach to pollution 
control.  Environmental harm is given a generic 
approach where there is an adverse effect on 
environmental quality whether it is ecological health, 
public amenity or safety. (Fisher 2000 pp.288-9) Final Report 
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KEY HIGHLIGHT 
The States have all moved towards separating title 
from land and water.  It is not a precondition to trade 
in water but well defined rights reduce transaction 
costs. 
Automatic renewal of licences over time has proven 
to be a problem in most jurisdictions in Australia.  The 
individual licences reflect the policy environment at 
the time.  The inconsistencies have proven to be a 
significant issue for water trading. Final Report 
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4.  WATER TRADING 
Trade in water has been occurring in Victoria and 
New South Wales since the early 1980s.  Trading 
became particularly important and widespread with 
droughts, diminished supplies, the Cap on water and 
in some areas, decreases in water allocations. 
Water trading in the Murray-Darling Basin is 
complicated by the variability of water flows.  As 
discussed in the introduction, the annual variability of 
flows means that the security of the property rights is 
going to be a major issue. 
South Australia and New South Wales have 
legislation in place that clearly separates title to land 
and water and allows licences to be traded either 
permanently or temporarily (complete transfer versus 
a lease of the water for a specified period).  It is now 
possible for a person who owns no land to hold a 
water license as an investment and sell water on an 
annual basis to any interested party.  Thus a system of 
well defined property rights is not a requirement for 
water trading though it certainly facilitates more 
efficient trade. 
There are basically two types of entitlements6 in the 
Basin: 
•  High Security  ￿ a licence for which the water will 
be provided except in severe drought conditions 
•  Low Security (or general security) ￿ a licence for 
available water which can vary from year to year. 
The South Australian system of rights allows only for 
high security water. 
Water Trading within States 
All States and Territories are committed to the 
principle of using water according to its highest and 
best use within social, physical and ecological 
constraints.  To facilitate moving towards efficient use 
of water States and Territories have been separating 
land and water entitlements.  This allows the owner 
of water rights to sell surplus water without selling 
the land.  The development of markets for water is 
well established in some States such as New South 
                                                 
6 Entitlements are the volume or share of water which a person is 
authorised to take under a licence. Final Report 
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Wales and Victoria.  Internet trading has begun and 
can be viewed at www.watertrading.com.au and 
www.waterexchange.com.au. 
 
In New South Wales in 1997-98, water trading was 
active and total sales amounted to 11% of total 
entitlements to consumptive users.  Much of the trade 
involves temporary transfers or leases of water.  Until 
the new legislation was passed, land and water 
licences were not separate in New South Wales.  
Permanent transfers required cancellation of the 
licence of the transferor and the issuing of a new 
licence to the transferee.  Temporary trades were 
much simpler and can be described as ￿leases￿ of the 
licence.  As a result of the availability of low security 
water and/or water for lease7 in most years, rice is 
one crop that is amenable to the uncertainty that is 
inherent in the New South Wales system.  In South 
Australia, the situation is considerably different 
where the irrigation of grapes requires a very secure 
source of water. Most trades in South Australia are 
permanent. 
As a general rule, permanent trades are subject to the 
consent of the water allocation authority and are 
rarely made without reference to a quasi-
environmental impact assessment process. 
In Victoria there are efforts being made to enhance the 
market for temporary and permanent trades.  
According to Goulburn-Murray (a major irrigation 
scheme), efforts are being made to provide better 
information on the trading performance.  There are 
continuing efforts to streamline trading in water.  For 
example, it may be possible to trade retail 
entitlements in the future. It is anticipated that there 
will be future efforts on trade between different 
supply systems and different reliabilities of supply. 
In setting up markets for water, there are numerous 
hydrological issues to consider prior to allowing trade 
between surface water and groundwater.  For 
instance, water banking has been used in South 
Australia as one means of dealing with this issue.  
                                                 
7 Depending on the timing in an irrigation season, this water 
might be high security or low security.  Low security water is 
announced each year based on water flows. Final Report 
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Victoria is also considering how to physically move 
the water between different systems.  
In Victoria and the other States, there are significant 
issues to resolve with respect to third party impacts.  
The States have been allowing trade to expand slowly 
in order to assess the impact on environmental health 
and water quality.  There are also costs associated 
with allowing water to leave an area. Irrigation 
schemes and communities are struggling with this 
issue. 
Permanent Inter-State Trade Pilot Project 
Under a two year pilot project, 9.8 GL of water was 
traded in the Mallee Region of South Australia, 
Victoria and New South Wales.  The geographic area 
covered is the Murray River between Nyah and the 
Barrages at the mouth of the Murray and the licences 
from the Darling River which are supplied from Lock 
10, near the junction of the Murray and Darling rivers. 
The Mallee region was selected largely because the 
region is relatively homogeneous in terms of security 
of entitlements.  As well, the same type of agricultural 
activity irrigated production of fruit, vegetable and 
grapes for wine is prevalent in the region and the 
price per megalitre (ML) of water is relatively 
uniform throughout the region. 
Only high security entitlement holders engaging in 
the permanent transfer of water are allowed to 
participate.  This includes holders of private high 
security licences in New South Wales, holders of 
water licences granted under the Water Resources Act 
of 1997 in South Australia and private diversion 
licences and pumped districts in Victoria. 
Even within this region, trading may have an impact 
on water supply as interstate trades can have an effect 
on other users. If water is coming from a different 
source such as another reservoir or another river then 
there will be transmission gains and losses along a 
system. As water moves down the rivers and channels 
there are more options for storage and therefore there 
is increased security.  To reflect these security issues, a 
set of exchange rates have been developed.  There is 
an exchange rate of 1.0 assigned to trades between 
New South Wales and Victoria (10 ML in NSW = 10 
ML in Victoria) as there is little effect on security. Final Report 
47 
Policy and Economic Research Unit 
CSIRO Land and Water 
Transfers upstream from South Australia to either 
New South Wales or Victoria are assigned an 
exchange rate of 0.9 (10 ML in SA = 9 ML in NSW or 
Victoria).  All interstate exchanges are subject to the 
Cap exchange rate of 0.9.  In a trade between South 
Australia and New South Wales, the SA cap on water 
would decrease by 9 ML (10 ML * 0.9 interstate 
exchange rate) and New South Wales would increase 
by 8.1 ML (0.9 interstate exchange rate * 0.9 Cap 
exchange rate).  The environment is thus 
compensated for the reduction in flow that occurs due 
to an upstream draw-down.  
Critical Issues in Inter-Region Trade 
Water will not necessarily be used according to its 
highest and best use because of restrictions on trade, 
nevertheless, some increases in efficiency will occur.  
Unused water has moved to expand production of 
horticultural products and wine grapes within the 
pilot region.  
•  There are significant transaction costs associated 
with inter-state trade.  There are the brokerage fees, 
the opportunity cost of time associated with buyer 
and seller connecting (whether through personal 
contacts or through an intermediary) and the costs 
associated with the trade gaining approval by the 
State of origin and the State of destination and the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission. 
•  A review of the two year pilot by Young et al (2000) 
concluded that many of the difficulties experienced 
during the pilot project (ie. high transaction costs) 
could be overcome by the dedication of the States and 
the MDBC. 
•  Young et al also concluded that arrangements 
needed to be put in place for strengthening the long 
term commitments to mitigating the environment 
impacts of trade.  For instance, a system of registering 
salinity obligations associated with the trade would 
need to be put in place. Final Report 
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KEY HIGHLIGHTS 
Water trading has resulted in some movement of 
water to higher value agriculture especially 
viticultural and horticultural crops.  As a general rule, 
it is moving away from low value irrigated pasture.   
Water trading has resulted in an increase in water use 
efficiency. 
Water trading is a source of conflict for irrigators 
within some irrigation schemes.  Water leaving an 
area is viewed as a major threat to the viability of the 
irrigation scheme and/or community. 
Water trading between jurisdictions requires 
coordination of trading rules. Final Report 
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5.  WATER QUALITY 
In this section of the report, we focus on water quality 
issues.  Water quality issues can be usefully divided 
into those associated with 
•  irrigation salinity; 
•  nutrient contamination that results in algal 
blooms; 
•  change in river flow regimes and supply of water 
to associated wetlands; 
•  dryland salinity. 
The Commission in consultation with States and 
Territories is in various stages of developing 
strategies to deal with each of these issues.  A set of 
National principles for the provision of Water for 
Ecosystems (environmental flows) was developed in 
response to criticisms of the early COAG water 
reform statements.   Critics suggested that there was a 
lack of awareness of the potential impact of water 
trading on the environment in early COAG 
documents.  
The resultant ARMCANZ/ANZECC principles 
express a goal of providing water for the environment 
which will sustain and where necessary restore 
ecological processes and biodiversity of water 
dependent ecosystems. 
The principles are as follows: 
•  River regulation and/or consumptive use should 
be recognised as potentially impacting on 
ecological values. 
•  Provision of water for ecosystem should be on the 
basis of the best scientific information available on 
the water regimes necessary to sustain the 
ecological values of water dependent ecosystems. 
•  Environmental water provisions should be legally 
recognised. 
•  In systems where there are existing users, 
provision of water for ecosystems should go as far 
as possible to meet the water regime necessary to 
sustain the ecological values of aquatic ecosystems 
whilst recognising the existing rights of other 
water users. Final Report 
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•  Where environmental water requirements cannot 
be met due to existing uses, action (including re-
allocation) should be taken to meet environmental 
needs. 
•  Further allocation of water for any use should only 
be on the basis that natural ecological processes 
and biodiversity are sustained (i.e. ecological 
values are sustained). 
•  Accountabilities in all aspects of management of 
environmental water provisions should be 
transparent and clearly defined. 
•  Environmental water provisions should be 
responsive to monitoring and improvements in 
understanding of environmental water 
requirements. 
•  All water uses should be managed in a manner 
which recognises ecological values. 
•  Appropriate demand management and water 
pricing strategies should be used to assist in 
sustaining ecological values of water resources. 
•  Strategic and applied research to improve 
understanding of environmental water 
requirements is essential. 
•  All relevant environmental, social and economic 
stakeholders will be involved in water allocation, 
planning and decision making on environmental 
water provisions. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative 
In 1982, following a long series of studies on salinity 
problems in the Murray Valley, the River Murray 
Agreement was extended to take account of water 
quality issues and then in 1984 further extended to 
give more but not total consideration of 
environmental responsibilities.  This resulted in 1985 
in a Ministerial agreement to form a Murray-Darling 
Basin Initiative that would result in the effective 
management of the Basins natural resources and its 
environment. 
Natural Resources Management Strategy 
In 1990 a Natural Resources Management Strategy 
was adopted by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial 
Council after a four-year process which included 
assessing the Basin￿s environmental resources.  The Final Report 
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Natural Resources Management Strategy established 
two fundamental ￿pillars￿ for handling natural 
resource management in the Basin.  The first ￿pillar￿ 
was the philosophy of integrated catchment 
management, recognising the linkages between 
various biophysical processes, which affect or are 
affected by water, its movement and its uses.  The 
second ￿pillar￿ was the community/government 
partnership, recognising that neither party working in 
isolation can protect the Basin￿s natural resources. 
The Natural Resources Management Strategy 
outlined resource management objectives for land, 
water and other environmental resources, and 
cultural heritage resources.  The strategy specified 
broad responsibilities for governments, communities, 
the Murray-Darling Basin Commission and 
Ministerial Council and the Murray-Darling 
Community Advisory Committee.  It also contained 
actions necessary to implement the strategy, including 
the development and implementation of community-
based action plans for improving on-ground 
management. 
In late 1999, the Commission commenced the 
development of a new Integrated Catchment 
Management Framework for the Basin for the period 
2001 to 2010. 
Basin Sustainability Plan 
The Basin Sustainability Plan provides the framework 
for the co-ordination of planning, monitoring, 
evaluation and reporting of natural resources 
management in the Murray-Darling Basin.  It was 
prepared in 1996 to focus the development of 
programs required to accelerate implementation of 
the 1990 Natural Resource Management Strategy.  
Following consultation with key groups, the 
objectives of the Basin Sustainability Plan were 
reviewed and updated in 1999 to ensure their 
relevance to priority natural resource management 
issues across the Basin. 
The Basin Sustainability Plan contains long-term 
Productivity and Resource Condition objectives for 
sustainable agriculture, water quality, nature 
conservation and cultural heritage.  For each of these 
priority ￿thematic￿ areas, specific objectives apply to 
irrigated and dryland regions of the Basin and to its 
riverine environments.  Reporting against these Final Report 
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objectives is designed to show short-term 
achievements (empowerment), medium-term 
achievements (implementation) and long-term 
outcomes (resource condition). 
The Plan also contains Direction Setting and 
Management Implementation objectives which focus 
on people and management arrangements.  These 
objectives are designed to help ensure that the 
arrangements for natural resource management 
enhance the partnership between community and 
government, and help the managers of land and 
water to protect the Basin￿s catchments. 
Salinity Trading 
One of the key documents associated with the Basin 
Sustainability Plan is a salinity and drainage strategy.  
A key observation in the strategy is that salinity is too 
large a problem to be solved by one government; it 
requires coordinated interstate action and community 
cooperation.  The central planks of the strategy are: 
•  salt interception schemes; 
•  changed operating rules for several lakes with a 
view to reducing evaporation and, hence, salt 
concentration; 
•  a suite of land management policies and programs 
jointly funded by the States and the 
Commonwealth. 
One of the unique features of this Strategy is the 
Victorian and New South Wales governments 
agreement to manage water resources within agreed 
limits. These States cannot construct or approve any 
proposal that would increase salinity by 0.1 EC or 
more in the River Murray at Morgan unless they have 
access to salinity credits. 
Under the salinity credit scheme, the New South 
Wales and Victorian governments received salinity 
credits of 15 EC each for their contributions to the 
costs of the interception schemes. States can earn 
more credits by financing schemes that reduce the 
expected salinity load at Morgan. The Murray-
Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) maintains a 
register of works undertaken and the salinity credit 
and debit impacts.  The salinity impact of any 
proposed irrigation scheme must offset by acquitting 
credits in the register.  The share of these annual costs Final Report 
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borne by individual land-holders is based upon a 
formula that takes into account an assessment of the 
size of the drainage benefits enjoyed by the 
landholder.   
According to MDBC (1999), in the Murray-Darling 
Basin, and in particular the Murray Valley, the 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy has: 
•  Increased awareness of the downstream salinity 
impacts of activities in upstream catchments; 
•  Established the ground rules for cost effective 
works to protect irrigation areas from land 
degradation; 
•  Initiated community debate on salinity and 
drainage issues; 
•  Reduced salinity in South Australia; and 
•  Protected the River from inappropriate 
development. 
Dryland Salinity 
The salinity and drainage strategy￿s focus was on 
irrigation salinity.  More recently, it has become clear 
that the major and more serious salinity problem is 
dryland salinity caused by water tables rising into 
saline soils because annual crops and pastures use less 
water than the ￿recently￿ cleared trees. 
Realising the potential significance of this, the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission organised a 
salinity audit which aimed to establish expected 
future salinity levels in the Murray in 2020, 2050 and 
2100.  Key features of this Audit include observations 
that: 
•  without significant  change, average salinity levels 
in the lower River Murray will exceed the 800 EC 
threshold for drinking water in the next 50-100 
years; 
•  the main source of this salt in the river system will 
come from dryland areas; 
•  by 2020 Adelaide￿s water supply from the Murray 
will exceed 800 EC more than 50% of the time; 
•  by 2100 many irrigation areas will no longer be 
able to grow crops. 
As a direct result of this Salinity Audit, the 
Commission with the States have been given a Final Report 
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mandate to develop a new salinity strategy.  While 
not yet released in draft form and typical of the 
Commission￿s style of operation, it is widely known 
that this will strengthen the above salinity trading 
scheme and attempt to put in place a trading and 
investment framework that will force each sub-
catchment to make the changes necessary to remain 
within salinity targets to be set for each valley. 
 
 KEY HIGHLIGHT 
Developing a system for dealing with salinity is a 
major achievement within the Basin.  The approach 
has been incremental and some might say has not 
moved fast enough but the system was developed in 
the spirit of cooperative federalism.   Final Report 
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6.  WATER ADMINISTRATION 
In this section of the report, the administrative 
structure in the Murray-Darling Basin will be 
considered in some detail.  There is considerable 
variation from State to State depending on how far 
along the reform process the individual State has 
progressed.  Some States and Territories have been 
moving towards models of community involvement 
over the last decade and thus have developed 
considerable expertise such as South Australia.   
Meanwhile States such as New South Wales and 
Victoria have considerable experience in cost recovery 
pricing. 
State Level Authorities 
Under the constitution, States and Territories within 
Australia are responsible for the management of 
natural resources.  While the overall framework for 
water management is set by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), the details of implementing 
principles fall on the individual States and Territories.  
Government departments provide the policy 
framework and management principles for the States 
and Territories.  Implementation is then taken down 
to the operation level (irrigation scheme, catchment 
board, water utility etc).  The separation of regulation 
and operation of the water resources is an ongoing 
process within States and Territories at this point in 
time. 
As stated in the introduction the Murray-Darling 
extends over a large geographical area.  The Murray-
Darling Basin extends over three-quarters of New 
South Wales, more than half of Victoria, a portion of 
Queensland and South Australia, and includes the 
whole of the Australian Capital Territory (excluding 
Jervis Bay). 
A map of the Basin is provided in Figure 6.1.  A series 
of maps are provided for the administrative areas 
under the jurisdiction of each of the States.  The maps 
provide a spatial outline of how water administration 
is organised in Murray-Darling Basin.  Geographic 
areas of administrative jurisdiction, water catchment 
and groundwater systems will not necessarily 
coincide. Final Report 
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Figure 6.1 
Map of the Murray-Darling Basin with State Lines 
source:  http://www.mdbc.gov.au 
As a result of the constitutional arrangements in 
Australia and the devolution of authority to the 
community, there are a variety of complex 
arrangements in place across states, catchments and 
subcatchments.  As a result, it may be useful to 
consider specific examples of institutional 
arrangements following an overview of how water 
administration is organised in each State. Final Report 
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New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the Department of Land and 
Water Conservation is responsible for water.  The 
website is 
www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au 
The State government provides the high level 
planning and operating principles for the 
management of water resources.  
A map below in Figure 6.2 outlines the regions for 
purposes of water administration in New South 
Wales.  The Far West, Murrumbidgee, Murray, 
Central West and Barwon are in the Murray-Darling 
Basin. 
Within the regions there are catchment river 
management committees which are responsible for 
planning within the catchment. 
Figure 6.2 




The Murrumbidgee catchment is a major 
subcatchment of the Murray-Darling Basin.   The 
Murrumbidgee River flows for 1 600 km and contains 
14 major dams and 8 large weirs.  The Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme assists with Final Report 
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regulations of water flow.  There are over 10 000 km 
of irrigation channels. 
 
Land use varies from sheep and cattle grazing, 
conservation reserves and expansion of residential 
areas in upper catchment to irrigated agriculture, 
horticulture, dryland cropping and grazing and 
forestry in the mid and lower areas of the catchment.  
 
The Murrumbidgee catchment is one of the most 
densely populated regions in rural Australia with a 
population of over 520 000 people.  It contains the 
Australian Capital Territory with population of 
approximately 305 000 people. 
 
For practical purposes the Murrumbidgee catchment 
can be divided into upper, mid and lower regions 
(moving from northeast to southwest on Figure 6.2).  
There is limited irrigation in the upper region, some 
irrigation in the mid region and the most intensive in 
the lower region where irrigation areas are 
undertaking comprehensive planning and 
management through the development of Land and 
Water Management Plans. The intensive nature of 
irrigation farming has the potential to contribute to 
salinity and waterlogging, water quality decline, poor 
quality land area drainage, buildup of soil 
contaminants and soil structural problems. In many 
cases native vegetation is completely removed from 
the area, resulting in a change from deep to shallow 
rooted vegetation with consequent water balance 
problems. Integrated management of these issues is 
required on individual properties and on a regional 
basis. Irrigation salinity is addressed as a separate 
issue because of its importance to sustainable 
irrigation.  
 
The Murrumbidgee Valley was first identified as an 
ideal site for large scale irrigation in 1891. The valley 
contains three main irrigation areas, Yanco, 
Coleambally8 and Mirrool, and many large scale river 
pumpers along the entire length of the Murrumbidgee 
River. It also includes irrigation districts of 
Benerembah, Wah Wah and Tabbita. The Hay Private 
                                                 
8 Colleambly Irrigation Limited will be used as an example of 
conflict resolution in section 7. Final Report 
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Irrigation District (HPID) is a smaller area than the 
other operations. At the lower end of the system, the 
extensive floodplain contains the Lowbidgee Flood 
Control and Irrigation District. Other water systems 
such as the Coleambally Outfall Drain and Western 
Wah Wah schemes have emerged due to the 
availability of water through drainage, stock and 
domestic supplies.  Set up to use surplus drainage 
water, these schemes have developed from stock and 
domestic use to become crucial parts of grazing and 





More than 4.8 million megalitres of water is used in 
Victoria each year with approximately 90% coming 
from surface water sources and 10% from 
groundwater.  Water use in Victoria is dominated by 
irrigation which uses approximately three quarters of 
the total volume of water extracted each year.  Most 
of the land under irrigation is supplied by the 
Goulburn and Murray rivers, north of the Great 
Dividing Range.  
About 570 000 hectares of farmland is irrigated in 
Victoria with 500 000 hectares supplied by public 
irrigation systems and the remaining 70 000 hectares 
irrigated through private diversions from waterways. 
In the State of Victoria, the Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment and the website is 
http://www.nre.vic.gov.au 
There are nine catchment water authorities in 
Victoria. Catchment Management Authorities, which 
have responsibility for the coordination and 
management of floodplains, rural drainage (including 
regional drainage schemes), water quality, Crown 
frontages and heritage rivers outside of national 
parks. They are also the major advisory body to 
government regarding funding priorities for 
catchment management.  
In Victoria, there are five catchment management 
authorities in the Murray-Darling Basin, which are 
responsible for the management of the water 
resources.  These include the catchment of Mallee, Final Report 
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Wimmera, North Central, Goulburn Broken and 
North East. 
Figure 6.3 
Catchment Authorities in the State of Victoria, 
Australia 
 
Source: http:\\ www.nre.vic.gov.au 
Rural Water Authorities manage and operate the 
Irrigation Districts as well as the Stock and Domestic 
system, and administer the diversion of water from 
waterways and the extraction of groundwater.  An 
example of a large water management authority is the 
Goulburn-Murray Water which covers major water 
storages and the major gravity irrigation areas in 
Victoria as well as pumped irrigation and waterworks 
districts. Goulburn-Murray Water’s region covers 68 
000 square kilometres of Victoria’s northern plains - 
from the Great Dividing Range north to the River 
Murray, from Corryong in the east, downriver to 
Nyah near Swan Hill.  This region includes the State’s 
major irrigation districts divided into six management 
areas:  Shepparton, Central Goulburn, Rochester-
Campaspe, Pyramid-Boort, Murray Valley and 
Torrumbarry, as well as three Waterworks Districts 
and ten river basins.  Final Report 
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Within its region Goulburn-Murray Water provides 
rural water and drainage services to approximately 24 
000 properties and is responsible for 
•  the management of the major water systems 
within its boundaries;  
•  provision of bulk supplies to (Non-
Metropolitan) Urban and Rural Water 
Authorities;  
•  and the delivery of irrigation water, domestic 
and stock supplies, and drainage services.  
Ten public irrigation districts are defined by statute. 
Within these districts, entitlements to water are 
governed by a special set of arrangements. Under the 
Water Act 1989, a bulk volume of water is allocated to 
each Irrigation District. This water is then 
apportioned among irrigators within the District by:  
•  an allocation for stock and domestic water 
supply to each rated property;  
•  a provision for estimated losses in the system;  
•  the allocation of the remaining water for 
irrigation.  Final Report 
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Figure 6.4 




Source:  http:\\ www.g-mwater.com.au 
Queensland 
Queensland is in the process of reforming much of its 
resource management with respect to water.  The 
Department of Natural Resources is responsible for 
water and the website is 
http:\\www.dnr.qld.gov.au. 
Queensland is in the process of corporatising its States 
Water Projects into a separate commercial entity. 
The map below in Figure 6.5 indicates the planning 
areas under the current process of reform. The 
department is also in the process of publishing a 
series of Water Management Plans (WMP) and Water 
Allocation Management Plans (WAMP) prepared by Final Report 
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community reference panels.  These plans will be 
used as part of the negotiation with the other States 
concerning how much water Queensland can divert 
under the Cap from the Basin. A text box outlines the 
planning process for the Moonie River Catchment and 
highlights some of the difficulties that Queensland 
faces in coming to terms with water reform and the 
Cap on diversions. 
In Queensland, there are 27 local government areas 
(LGAs) in the Murray-Darling Catchment.  The urban 
councils of Toowoomba, Roma, Dalby and 
Goondiwindi have the largest impact on the Basin 
through land management, water supply, waste 
management and sewage treatment.  These 
governments coordinate their activities through the 
Local Government Association of Queensland.  
Figure 6.5 
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An example from Queensland will help to illustrate 
how catchment boards have prepared their own plans 
which will feed into the water plan for the State of 
Queensland.  
 
Text Box 6.1 
Preparing a Water Management Plan in the Moonie River Catchment, 
Queensland 
This example from Queensland represents one approach to catchment 
planning.  In this catchment, members of a community reference panel, 
scientific and technical experts and government agencies worked together to 
develop the Water Management Plan.  The Department of Natural Resources 
subsequently published a draft of the Plan. 
The Moonie River Catchment can be seen in Figure 6.5 in the southeast 
portion of the map.  It is flanked by the Condamine-Balone Rivers Basin to the 
north and west and the Borders Rivers Basin to the east.   Almost all of the 
Moonie catchment lies in Queensland and represents about 1% of the total 
catchment area of the Murray-Darling Basin. 
The plan contains an assessment of the current situation in the catchment. 
There has been an increase in demand for water for large scale agricultural 
developments in the catchment.  Beef cattle and sheep grazing are the most 
predominant forms of grazing and an increasing amount of area is being 
converted to improved pasture. 
Water is being extracted for urban use, irrigation, rural domestic, stock 
watering and industrial purposes. Current levels of extraction, whether 
licensed or not, is about 76% of the natural mean annual flow.  If all the works 
which are licensed are actually brought on line, the extraction level would be 
74% of natural mean annual flow. 
Following consultation with irrigators, interested parties in the community, 
indigenous peoples and scientific experts, the government has set a series of 
broad objective to: 
•  maintain the mean annual discharge of the Moonie River at the 
Queensland/New South Wales border at 70% of its natural mean annual 
discharge, 
•  maintain the nautral flow variability, and to 
•  provide supply security for users. 
The plan also considers groundwater supplies.  A groundwater licence will be 
provided if the total rate of extraction from all bores within an aquifer was 
less than the recharge rate from all sources relating to that aquifer. 
The plan indicates that there will be a re-evaluation of the plan and/or 
amendment of the plan if the total annual basin wide diversions are beyond 
the predicted range.  This leaves the possibility of decreasing the amount of 
water that can be diverted by water users. 
Source:  Draft Water Management Plan, Moonie River Catchment May 2000 Final Report 
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Another interesting model that emerged during this 
case study of the Basin is the Queensland Murray-
Darling Basin Coordinating Committee.  The 
Committee coordinates the activities of the four 
catchment boards, landcare groups, regional 
assessment panel, Darling Downs Local Government 
Association, relevant State government departments 
and Aboriginal groups.  
South Australia 
In the case of South Australia, we will go into a bit 
more detail in order to outline how the decision 
making process works.  It is a model of successful 
communication across levels of entities, which make 
and implement decisions. 
In South Australia, Department of Environment and 
Heritage was responsible for water until very 
recently. 
Several months ago, the South Australian government 
in response to increasing concerns about expected 
declines in water quality separated water 
management from other environmental issues and 
formed a new Department for Water Resources.  The 
website is 
http://www.environment.sa.gov.au 
This trend goes against practice in other States which 
seeks to integrate all forms of land and water 
management within a single department.  This 
reversal of policy is explained by Ministers as 
necessary to give a strong political focus to water 
management in a State which is facing a massive 
increase in salinity. 
South Australian Water Corporation is a corporate 
entity that owns, manages and operates South 
Australia’s water supply and wastewater treatment 
systems.  The Department for Water Resources is 
responsible for water policy and strategic direction.  
In South Australia, there is only one catchment 
management board in the Murray-Darling Basin and 
it is the River Murray Water Catchment see Figure 
6.6. 
Catchment management has been underway 
involving community input for many years in South 
Australia.  The Water Resources Act 1997 formalised Final Report 
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the provisions for more community involvement in 
water resource management decisions.  Catchment 
boards are designed under the Act to be skills based.    
Within the River Murray Water Catchment, there is 
the River Murray Prescribed Water Course Areas and 
the Noora, Mallee and Angas-Bremer Prescribed 
Wells Area.  
 
Figure 6.6 
Map of Prescribed Water Areas, South Australia 
source:http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/water/pdfs/swp_volume2.pdf 
The decision making process regarding water 
resources in South Australia is probably the most 
straight forward given the relatively few catchments 
and prescribed areas involved.  Figure 6.7 outlines the 
decision making bodies involved in setting priorities 
and planning resource use.  
 Final Report 
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Figure 6.7 
Decision Making Regarding Water in South Australia 
 
High level decisions, for instance regarding the Cap 
on water diversion from the Murray-Darling Basin, 
are made at the level of the Murray-Darling 
Ministerial Council.  These decisions to which the 
State has agreed are then brought back to the South 
Australian Ministers and Premier and the Department 
for Water Resources to be implemented. 
The Department has been in the process of taking the 
directions set out by the Ministerial Council, Council 
of Australian Governments, Agriculture and Resource 
Management Council of Australian and New Zealand 
(ARMCANZ) and Australian and New Zealand 
Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) 
and putting these policies into practice.  The 
Department has been encouraging skills based boards 
to prepare catchment plan and water allocation plans 
which feed into and are consistent with the State 
Water Plan.   Textbox 6.2 provides a description of the 
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Text Box 6.2 
River Murray Catchment Water Management Board 
The Board consists of: 
River Murray Catchment Water Management Board Members 
Jim McColl ￿ SA agricultural and natural resources consultant and 
former Director-General of Agriculture (Chair); 
Guy Boothby - Currency Creek flower farmer. Deputy Chair 
RAMSAR Consultative Committee for the Coorong and Lower 
Lakes and a member of Fleurieu Regional Development Board;   
Ian Kroehn - Irrigator, Chairman of Waikerie Irrigation Trust, 
Director Central Irrigation Trust, member of Riverland West LAP; 
Peter Norman - General Manager Country with SA Water and an 
experienced water resources manager;  
Joanne Pfeiffer - dairy framer from Long Flat in the Lower Murray, 
member National Murray-Darling Basin Community Advisory 
Committee; 
 Peter Arnold - a viticulturist from Barmera. Former Minister for 
Water Resources. Chair SA Dried Fruits Board and Director 
Wetlands Care Australia;  
Ray MacDonald - from Angas Plains, a potato grower and past 
presiding member of The Angas Bremer Water Resources 
Committee;   
Jeff Parish - Chief Executive of Central Irrigation Trust in Barmera 
and experienced in the operation of large scale irrigation districts; 
and 
Bill Paterson - is CEO of the Coorong District Council, a Murray-
Darling Association representative and a member of the Coorong 
District LAP Committee   
The River Murray Catchment Management Board 
consists of an independent chair and members.  Its 
offices are located at Berri on the Murray River and 
not in Adelaide ￿ the capital city of the State. 
A skills based board does not guarantee that conflicts 
will not arise.  Instead the catchment becomes a forum 
for constructive discussion among the various 
interests in the catchment.  The various players must 
negotiate through contentious issues before a water 
allocation plan can be adopted. 
In South Australia, boards have the power to set and 
collect a levy to fund its activities and even have the Final Report 
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power to ask the Minister to amend a local 
government plan for them.  
Responsibility Matrix 
A responsibility matrix has been constructed for an 
area in South Australia. This example was chosen 
because the Angas-Bremar Prescribed Wells Area has 
a relatively straight forward process of 
administration.  The area has a good relationship with 
the Department for Water Resources and the process 
of developing and implementing plans is well 
understood by the community.  The responsible 
catchment board is the River Murray Catchment 
Water Management Board. 
The matrix is constructed in terms of which agencies 
take a role in each specific task.  The agency might 
have: 
Executive responsibility (E) ￿ ultimate responsibility for 
the task though parts of the task may be delegate 
Management responsibility (M) ￿ primary responsibility 
to manage  
Planning (P) ￿ involved in the planning process. 
Consulted (C) ￿ consulted about the task 
Regulatory Responsibility (R) ￿ responsible for the 
regulatory side 
Interested Party (IP) 
South Australia ￿ Angas-Bremer Prescribed Wells 
Area 
Task DWR  EPA  SAW*  LC PWA MDBC 
 
RMCWMB 
Governance E            M 
Water Allocation  E  IP      P  IP  M 
Water Distribution      M    E M    P 
Water Quality Protection  C   IP  E R      C IP P     
Flood Protection          IP  IP  P 
Wetland Protection  E M R        IP  IP  P 
Maintenance of 
Infrastructure 
   M  M      C 
State Water Plan  E  C  C  C  
P 
C P  IP  C 
Design and Construction 
of New Facilities 
C  C  M  P    M  P     
 
DWR ￿ Department for Water Resource 
RMCWMB ￿ River Murray Catchment Water Management 
Board  Final Report 
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EPA - Environmental Protection Agency 
SAW ￿ SA Water 
Langhorn Creek ￿ private consortium of irrigators 
PWA ￿ Prescribed Wells Area 
MDBC ￿ Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
*  Note SA Water provides water to country towns and 
thus SA Water and the Prescribed Wells Area do not 
actually overlap in the management of resources.  
The Angas-Bremer area described in Textbox 7.2 is an 
example of how farmers are able to organise and 
coordinate their efforts with the State government as 
well as local landcare groups to manage resources 
sustainably. 
Not shown are the many other institutional 
arrangements that through their use of natural 
resource, (agriculture, urban development, etc) have a 
significant influence on the demand for water and 
water quality outcomes. Final Report 
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7.  WATER PRICING AND WATER DELIVERY 
As introduced earlier in the report, the National 
Competition Policy, endorsed by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in 1995, provides 
the framework in Australia at the present time.  This 
policy and the related reforms have shaped the 
process of water reform.  Two important parts of the 
reform process include how to price the resource and 
how best to deliver it. 
Fee Collection 
Fee collection is a fairly straight forward manner in 
the well developed commercial economy of Australia.  
Water users are billed for water by the corporate 
entity, trust or in some cases still, the government 
agency that provided the water. 
Water Pricing 
In the 1990s, many of the States were reforming 
pricing of water for irrigation and water for 
household consumption (and stock watering in some 
cases).  The pricing of what is considered ￿urban￿ 
water is relevant in the Murray-Darling Basin because 
the Australian Capital Territory contains Canberra 
(population 305 000).  The City of Adelaide 
(population 1.1 million), outside the Basin, is a major 
downstream consumer of River Murray water, 
especially in drought years. 
Basic principles of economics suggest that a resource 
will be used most efficiently where the competitive 
market would price the resource.  This is usually 
taken to be the long run marginal cost (or the 
incremental cost per unit of water).  Water and many 
other utilities have large fixed or ￿start-up￿ costs 
which leads to a decreasing cost industry where 
average and marginal costs decrease with the amount 
produced (at least over the relevant range).  Thus, 
there is always a tendency for a few firms (often only 
one in a particular jurisdiction) to supply water. 
Pricing at marginal cost in a decreasing cost industry 
means that average costs are not covered in the long 
run.  In the long run, a competitive firm must cover its 
costs.  Further, marginal cost pricing will not allow for 
covering the costs of future expansions as are 
sometimes required in water systems. Final Report 
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These economic considerations are in part covered by 
the key elements of the water pricing policy of 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  In the 
case of pricing, the COAG reforms codified many of 
the policies which had been floating at the time.  The 
COAG pricing regime is to be based on: 
•  consumption based pricing and full cost recovery 
for urban water and rural water supplies; 
•  the elimination of cross subsidies as far as possible 
and their exposure where they exist; 
•   cost recovery that includes environmental costs 
(externalities) and the cost of asset consumption as 
well as taking the cost of capital into account; 
•  positive real rates of return on written-down 
replacement costs of assets; 
•  future investment in new schemes or extensions to 
existing schemes to be undertaken only after 
appraisal indicates it is economically viable and 
ecologically sustainable. 
On a State by State basis, full cost pricing is at various 
stages of implementation.  Cost recovery pricing is 
not a straight forward process to implement.  Some 
States and Territories are further along this process 
than others.  According to the Progress Report to the 
Council of Australian Governments, water sold in 
urban areas is sold on a cost recovery basis though 
there is some question whether any account is being 
taken of the environmental externalities. 
Guidelines for costing and charging for externalities 
are being considered by the High Level Steering 
Group on Water.  Prior to reform, it was common in 
Australian cities for users to pay a flat fee based on 
property values for a generous base or free allowance 
of water.  Consumers who exceeded the base 
allowance paid a volumetric charge. 
New South Wales 
New South Wales established the Government Pricing 
Tribunal which evolved into the Independent Pricing 
and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART).  Both entities 
predate the COAG reforms.  Thus New South Wales 
has more experience upon which to draw than other 
States. Final Report 
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It is important to note that IPART is an independent 
authority that is aware of the COAG guidelines but 
does not report directly to COAG or ARMCANZ. 
IPART makes price determinations which the New 
South Wales government generally adopts. 
IPART reviews information on costs and revenues 
and makes a determination regarding bulk water 
prices.  IPART considers for instance whether the 
department￿s costs represent an efficient level of 
service.  Further, as Musgrave (1999) reports: 
The tribunal also faced a contentious task in 
assigning the costs of functions that delivered more 
than one service.  It employed the basic principle that 
costs should be paid for by those who benefit from the 
service in proportion to the benefit received, with the 
government paying for the cost of public benefit. 
p.307 
IPART considered what the appropriate structure for 
bulk water prices should be in order to promote 
efficiency and ecologically sustainable development.  
The extractive users, particularly the irrigators, 
mounted opposition to the potential increases in 
price.  However, the tribunal conducted its review in 
a very public forum and consulted with interested 
groups across society.  In the end, IPART was able to 
develop a set of pricing rules that were accepted for 
adoption at the national level by the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture and Resource 
Management.  The rules are currently being used to 
guide the process of price reform across jurisdictions. 
The problem of how to determine what full cost 
recovery levels is complicated by the issue of how the 
cost of new capital or infrastructure might be 
handled.  IPART for example has deemed that the 
opportunity cost of the existing infrastructure is zero 
and uses a forward looking annuity approach to 
calculate costs instead of a method of depreciation. 
Victoria 
In Victoria, Treasury is directly responsible for setting 
prices for metropolitan areas including the bulk water 
supplied by Melbourne water to other retail water 
companies.  The Minister of Agriculture and 
Resources is responsible for setting prices for non-
residential use.  Victoria has already implemented full 
cost pricing for rural areas due to major reforms, Final Report 
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which occurred in the 1980￿s.  No attempt has been 
made to extend this charging framework to include 
formal consideration of externalities.  It is possible to 
argue, however, that these costs are already embodied 
in the many regulations and policies that influence 
water use. 
South Australia 
In South Australia, a catchment water board is able to 
charge a levy based on requirements for future 
infrastructure and resource management.  Most 
irrigation schemes charge fees based on operating 
costs of delivering the irrigation water. 
Reticulated water is largely supplied by the SA Water. 
Water pricing is on the basis of customer classes at the 
present time.  South Australia is presently in the 
process of reviewing its pricing policy.  A public 
consultation paper was released in December 1999 
and the discussion it generated is under review.    
Water pricing within a customer class is consistent 
across the State in that a residential user pays the 
same amount regardless of where he/she lives in the 
State.  Residential consumers pay $123 access charge 
and pay 36 cents per litre for the first 125 KL of water 
a year and 92 cents thereafter.  Country lands and 
industrial users pay an access charge of $136 and 36 
cents for the first 125 KL and 91 cents per KL 
thereafter.  Commercial water pricing is based on a 
more complicated multi-tiered structure: 
•  annual access charge of $136 plus $2.13 per $1 000 
of improved property value over $63 850 (which 
gives the commercial user a ￿free￿ allowance of 
water equal to the access charge divided by 91 
cents per KL) and 
•  91 cents per KL for water consumed in excess of 
the ￿free￿ allowance. 
This structure can encourage households to conserve 
water but large industrial users will tend to be 
charged the highest price (per unit basis) in two tier 
pricing regimes.  In a deregulated environment where 
barriers to entry are reduced, it may even be 
worthwhile for firms to enter to service the high-price 
customer as high volume water tends to have a low 
marginal cost. Final Report 
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There are really no bulk water sales in South 
Australia.  A few small cooperative trusts exist and 
sell water to their members.  In the rural areas, 
irrigators must have a license in order to draw water 
from the Murray.  New projects or infrastructure in 
the basin are on a full cost recovery basis.  There are 
still some questions about cross subsidies.  
As identified above, none of the States has 
incorporated the environmental costs into full cost 
recovery.  As part of the National High Level Steering 
Group on Water, South Australia is leading a project 
on Identifying, Costing and Charging for Externalities 
generated by water use throughout the country. 
Queensland 
Queensland is in the midst of a consultation process 
regarding water pricing.  
Water Allocation and Delivery 
As part of the water reform package, there was a push to 
separate policy and regulation from day to day operations.  
As a result, most States and the Australian Capital 
Territory have ￿corporatised￿ the operation of water 
delivery.  An example is the South Australian Water, 
which is owned by the State.  Another example is the River 
Murray, which is discussed in Text Box 7.1.  Final Report 
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Text Box 7.1 
River Murray Water 
River Murray Water has been established by the Murray-Darling 
Basin Ministerial Council as an internal business division of the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission for the specific purpose of 
operating and managing aspects of the River Murray system. River 
Murray Water commenced operations in January 1998. Its 
establishment as an internal business unit provides a clear 
distinction between the service delivery functions of the 
Commission and its resource management and policy setting 
functions. The primary services provided by River Murray Water 
are:  
•  Water storage and delivery 
•  Salinity mitigation (operation of salinity mitigation schemes) 
•  Navigation 
•  Recreation and tourism 
•  Other, including hydro-power  
The River Murray Water came about as a result of a number of 
factors that have been influencing Australian water authorities to 
create more business-like arrangements for delivery water services. 
The two most important factors are the objectives of the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) to: 
•  Separate service delivery from regulatory and resource 
management policy matters so as to achieve clear and effective 
outcomes; and 
•  price for cost recovery and remove cross-subsidies, promote 
efficiencies, and ensure sustainability of the assets of the business.  
In response to these various drivers, the Ministerial Council 
decided that a ’water business’ should be established with the 
mission: 
"In accordance with the Council of Australian Governments water 
resource policy and Murray-Darling Basin Commission policies, to 
contract with each owner of the water to provide a delivery service which 
generates adequate revenue to allow effective maintenance and long term 
replacement/creation of assets and the move towards a positive real rate of 
return in accordance with a timetable agreed with the owners of the 
business." 
Source: http://www.mdbc.gov.au/ Final Report 
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In this new environment of competitiveness, 
governments are no longer building irrigation 
schemes as they did earlier in the century.  As a result, 
private irrigators have become directly involved in 
the provision of irrigation water in South Australia as 
can be seen in Text Box 7.2.  
 
Text Box 7.2 
The Angas-Bremer Prescribed Wells Area 
In the early 1990s, a consortium of private irrigators in South 
Australia, specifically Langhorn Creek in the Angas-Bremer 
prescribed wells area (see Figure 6.6), built their own pipeline from 
the River Murray.  The area had been using groundwater prior to 
the construction of the pipeline.  Concerns about the sustainability 
of the groundwater resources had lead to innovative approaches to 
aquifer recharge through water banking. 
The pipeline is the largest privately built pipeline in Australia with 
35 km of pipe and some 48 outlets serving approximately 41 
irrigators.  The pipeline has a capacity of 400 000 gallons per hour.  
Each irrigator in the consortium contributed to the initial cost of 
construction based on how much water per hour the irrigator 
needed and the location of the irrigator on the pipeline.  Each 
irrigator pays a monthly maintenance fee and their share of the cost 
of electricity.  Each irrigator holds a licence for the water that they 
are using. 
Access to a secure source of water has allowed for a shift towards 
more profitable enterprises such as growing grapes, vegetables, and 
some lucerne.  
Members of the consortium were also involved in the water 
management planning process for the area.  
This is a unique example of how the private sector can become 
involved in the planning process as well as the delivery of water.  
There are a couple of key reasons why this consortium works.  
First, there is a commitment by the community to the long 
sustainability of their farming operations.  This is reflected in the 
difficult choices and the financial commitment the community has 
made to dealing with groundwater and surface water issues. Final Report 
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Second there is the issue of accountability.  Each irrigator must 
prepare an annual report regarding the use of water over the year.  
Summary documents are prepared for annual general meetings, 
which show each irrigator where they stand relative to all the other 
consortium members (without being able to identify the other 
irrigators).  This has proven to be sufficient to keep individual 
irrigators in line with community goals. 
Based on personal communication with Bruce Allnut. 
 
In New South Wales, the Murray Irrigation Limited is 
a private irrigation company formed in March 1995 
when the New South Wales Government Murray 
Irrigation Area and Districts were privatised and 
ownership transferred to irrigators. 
Text Box 7.3 
Murray Irrigation Limited 
Murray Irrigation Limited provides irrigation and drainage 
services to 2400 farms owned by 1600 family farm businesses 
covering almost 800000 ha of farmland in the upper reaches of the 
River Murray System. 
Murray Irrigation Limited holds the largest single private irrigation 
licence in the Murray-Darling Basin. Murray Irrigation Limited has 
an entitlements to 1450 GL which is 75% of New South Wales 
general security water entitlements.  
Murray Irrigation Limited is regulated by the State government 
through the NSW Environment Protection Authority and Water 
Management Works Licence with the Department of Land and 
Water Conservation (DLWC). Compliance conditions require 
Murray Irrigation Limited to minimise any negative environmental 
impacts of their operations.  
Murray Irrigation Limited is also the implementation authority for 
the Murray Land and Water Management Plans (LWMPs). The 
Murray LWMPs are a major integrated natural resource strategy 
developed by the Murray community, in partnership with 
government between 1991 and 1995. The Murray Plans aim to 
protect the environmental, social and economic values of the 
region. They are a leading example of how a genuine partnership 
between the community and government can address complex 
environmental issues on a regional scale. The Murray LWMPs 
involve a total investment of $498 M over 30 years shared between 
the regional community ($382 M) and government ($116 M).  
Source: http:\\ www.murrayirrigation.com.au  Final Report 
79 
Policy and Economic Research Unit 
CSIRO Land and Water 
 
KEY HIGHLIGHT 
The idea of pricing at close to long run marginal costs 
has certain advantages in terms of economic 
efficiency. 
 
Full cost pricing is not a straight forward process.  No 
consensus has emerged across the States concerning 
what should be included in ￿the full cost￿.  There is a 
lack of agreement on even how existing infrastructure 
should be treated, let alone environmental costs.  This 
indicates that significant work remains to be done.  Final Report 
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8.  CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
One of the key lessons of the Murray-Darling Basin is 
that institutions can serve as mechanisms to resolve 
conflict.  When institutions fail to resolve conflicts 
they must evolve or be disbanded.  As transaction 
costs amongst increase, in this case operating in the 
Basin, there is an incentive to create institutions to 
internalise these costs. 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
There are numerous examples in the Murray-Darling 
Basin beginning with the Murray-Darling Agreement.  
Early conflicts arose between users of the River 
Murray for irrigation and navigation.  However, an 
agreement between the States of New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia was not reached until 
after a series of severe droughts raised the cost of non-
cooperation past the threshold for the three States (see 
Appendix I for a history of the Basin). 
The existence of the River Murray Commission from 
1917 to 1985 speaks of the Commission￿s ability to 
work cooperatively with the States and to coordinate 
the construction and operation of some of the works 
on the River.  Regulating the flows of the River clearly 
served the interest of the States (eg expansion of 
agriculture in the Basin). 
The Commission expanded its role over time but was 
not able to evolve into an institution capable of 
dealing with Basin wide problems such as salinity and 
the declining health of the riverine environment.  As 
States realised they could not resolve these issues 
within their own jurisdictions and costs would 
continue to escalate with inaction, there was again the 
incentive to develop a new institution ￿ the Murray-
Darling Basin Commission. 
Murray-Darling Basin Community Advisory 
Committee 
Over the last decade or so, the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission has become increasingly aware of the 
need for the benefits of community consultation.  To 
this end, in 1986 it established a community advisory 
committee that reports directly to the Murray-Darling 
Basin Ministerial Council.  The committee consists of: 
•  an independent chair; Final Report 
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•  21 catchment/regional representatives (New 
South Wales 7, Victoria 5, South Australia 4, 
Queensland 4, Australian Capital Territory 1); 
•  5 specialist peak organisation representatives 
(Agriculture, Conservation, Local Government, 
Landcare and Indigenous people). 
Today, virtually all Commission programs involve a 
large degree of consultation.  Most policy reforms are, 
at least, discussed with the Council and explored 
through transparent media and meeting-based 
processes.  Draft policies and/or strategies are then 
released and finalised after a period of time. 
Irrigation Schemes 
Within the Basin, most of the large irrigation schemes 
were created to deliver water and encourage the 
expansion of agriculture.  The water reform process 
and the Cap on diversions has changed the operating 
environment of these entities such as Goulburn-
Murray Water in Victoria and Murray Irrigation 
Limited (discussed in Textbox 7.3) in New South 
Wales. 
These institutions have evolved over time from a 
means to put irrigation infrastructure in place to 
institutions which manage water from planning 
through operation stages.  Water trading would 
appear to represent a potential threat to the continued 
viability of these institutions. For instance, Murray 
Irrigation Limited does not permit permanent water 
trades outside its boundaries once the bulk 
entitlement falls below a certain level (MJA 2000). 
Murray Irrigation recently recommended to the 
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council that a 
process be put in place to provide a forum for 
resolving intra-valley conflicts that would 
•  provide the parties with an opportunity to 
influence resolution of the conflict, 
•  include an independent mediator and  
•  require provision of robust information to the 
parties involved. 
This points to unresolved issues and there is no 
immediate evidence that provisions will be made to 
set up new mechanisms.  Murray Irrigation Limited 
has issued position papers that suggest that there is a Final Report 
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Another example of conflict resolution comes through 
unexpected mechanisms.  Colleambly Irrigation is a 
privately owned irrigation corporation that has 
traditionally delivered irrigation water but over time 
has been evolving into a natural resource manager. 
Colleambly recently obtained ISO 9002 and 14001 
accreditation.9  Applying for this accreditation 
provided a means of conflict resolution between 
Colleambly, non-governmental organisations and the 
media about the health of the river environment. 
There was a crisis in confidence about the land and 
water management planning process and the impact 
that irrigation in New South Wales was having on the 
environment.  The New South Wales government was 
moving to impose costly monitoring and reporting 
requirements.  Colleambly perceived that it did not 
have time to wait for natural resource outcomes to 
demonstrate that it was a responsible resource 
manager.  The accreditation process proved successful 
in demonstrating commitment to the environment 
and a means of differentiating itself in a competitive 
environment.  
Catchment Boards 
At the catchment level, people are most closely 
associated with environment and the water resources.  
Throughout the Basin, there are catchment boards 
with differing levels of experience, expertise and 
power.  Most boards engage in public consultation 
and have varying degrees of community involvement.  
This is a means of engaging people in the issues and it 
is also a process in education for most of the 
interested parties.  Through consultation, boards as 
well as the public learn about the State of the 
catchment and the positions of the various parties 
with respect to what should be done.  South Australia 
is currently the only state which gives boards the 
power to raise levies.   
                                                 
9 ISO 9002 is accreditation systems where a set of procedures to 
ensure a certain level of quality are in place.  ISO 14001 is an 
environmental management system based on the same 
accreditation process. Final Report 
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The consultation process with the community is often 
cited by catchment managers as a useful process for 
uniting divergent interests.  The chairs of catchment 
boards which are unable to navigate through the 
conflict come under pressure to resign or not seek a 
renewal of their position.  The process usually restarts 
with the appointment of a new chair.  
The Courts 
Ultimately the court system is Australia serves as a 
place where remedies for conflict can be sought.  
Generally this is an expensive process for water users, 
States or Territories to engage in.  These costs often 
serve as a means of motivating the different entities to 
work to solutions through other means. 
 
KEY HIGHLIGHT 
Institutions within the Basin serve as a means of 
internalising transactions costs and/or mechanisms 
for conflict resolution. 
The cost of engaging in court battles often serves as a 
means of getting parties back to the table. Final Report 
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APPENDIX I 
A Brief History of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement  
According to Crabb (1997), managing the River 
Murray has always been difficult and complicated 
because the boundary between New South Wales and 
Victoria was ￿ and still is ￿ the top of the bank on the 
Victorian side of the Murray. 
Initially, the Murray was of immense economic 
importance as a means of transportation.  This in part 
explains the number of clauses in the Australian 
Constitution that came into operation with the 
Federation of Australia in 1901 (Wright 1978). With 
the first diversions of water from the Murray for 
irrigation in the 1880s, conflict developed with those 
concerned with the use of the river for navigation. 
One of the first discussions on managing the Basin 
took place in 1863 at a conference held in Melbourne 
between New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia to consider putting locks on the rivers to 
improve the navigability of the river. At this 
conference it was concluded that expanding 
commerce, population, and wealth of Australia could 
be accomplished by making the Murray, Edward, 
Murrumbidgee and Darling navigable.  
Although nothing concrete resulted from this 
conference, at least all of the participants were in 
agreement (Eastburn 1990). Many other conferences 
were held over the following 40 years, but little 
progress was made, largely due to the prevailing 
parochialism of the three colonies (Crabb 1997). 
The River Murray Waters Agreement 
Severe droughts that extended through 1895 to 1902 
forced the colonies/States to work together and 
finally come to an agreement in 1915. The 
governments of Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, 
and South Australia signed the River Murray Waters 
Agreement.  It took a further two years to establish 
the River Murray Commission, which had the task of 
putting the River Murray Waters Agreement into 
effect. 
The River Murray Waters Agreement was a 
pioneering document in its time and the same can be 
said of the River Murray Commission. Its prime task Final Report 
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was the regulation of the main stream of the Murray 
to ensure that each of the three States received their 
agreed shares of the Murray’s water.  
The main provisions in the first Agreement allowed 
for: 
•  the construction of a storage on the upper Murray; 
 •  the construction of a storage at Lake Victoria; 
•   the construction of 26 weirs and locks on the 
Murray between Blanchetown in South Australia and 
Echuca in Victoria; and  
•   the construction of nine weirs and locks on the 
lower part of either the Darling or Murrumbidgee 
Rivers (the Murrumbidgee was selected). 
Over the 70 years it was in operation, numerous 
amendments were made to the River Murray Waters 
Agreement. This did not prevent conflict and 
controversy.  For example, some actions of the 
Commission, in particular the abandonment of the 
Chowilla Dam proposal and the construction of 
Dartmouth Dam (Wright 1974) were very 
controversial decisions. 
The powers of the River Murray Commission were 
gradually extended, both by amendment and 
informal practice, but its prime concern remained 
with water quantity. 
Major dams such as the Hume and Dartmouth Dams 
were built, as well as 13 locks and weirs between 
Blanchetown and Torrumbarry, the Lake Victoria 
storage, the Maude and Redbank Weirs on the 
Murrumbidgee, and the Barrages at the Murray 
Mouth.  
In the late 1960s, the River Murray Commission 
conducted studies in the salinity levels in the Murray 
Valley. This initiative ultimately led to the further 
amendment of the River Murray Waters Agreement 
in 1982. The Commission’s role was broadened to take 
account of water quality issues. It was becoming clear 
that successful management of the Basin’s river 
systems was directly related to land use throughout 
the catchment, further amendments to the Agreement 
in 1984 enhanced the Commission’s environmental 
responsibilities in a limited way.  Final Report 
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By the early 1980s, it was clear that the River Murray 
Waters Agreement and the River Murray 
Commission were unsuitable for the management of 
the Basin’s growing resource and environmental 
problems. Concurrently, individual agencies within 
the separate States were finding they were unable to 
tackle the rising water salinity and irrigation-induced 
land salinisation. It was gradually realised that critical 
issues were no longer confined within distinct 
jurisdictions, but extended across State boundaries.  
In October 1985, a meeting was held in Adelaide of 
ministers responsible for land, water and other 
environmental resources from the governments of 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the 
Commonwealth. The meeting was called to discuss 
the resource and environmental problems of the 
Murray-Darling Basin and in particular salinity and 
land degradation. Two years of intensive meetings 
and negotiations by politicians and bureaucrats from 
the four governments culminated in the Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement.  
The Agreement provided the foundation for the 
Murray-Darling Basin Initiative by putting in place a 
process for the effective management of the water, 
land and other environmental resources on a Basin-
wide basis.  In 1988, the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission was put in place as part of the new Act 
and Agreement. 
 Source:  http:\\www.mdbc.gov.au 
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